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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE INTELLIGENCE STUDY

Reference: (a) Pictomap Supplement, 1:25,000 Sheet 6330 II-N, 6330 II-S,
6329 I-N

Enclosures: (1) Area Study Quang Xuyen
(2) Area Study Can Gio
(3) Doan-10 Organizational Structure
(4) VC Village Organization

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Location

The Rung Sat Special Zone is located about 20 miles south-southeast of Saigon. It is made up of two districts, Quang Xuyen and Can Gio, which is under the military control of the Vietnamese Navy, Rung Sat Special Zone Headquarters located at Nha Be and belonging to Gia Dinh Province for its administration and logistics support. It is bounded on the north by Nha Be and Nhon Trach Districts and to the west Long An and Go Cong Province. The southern boundary is the South China Sea and to the east is Phuoc Tuy Province. It has approximately 485 square miles of tidal swamp with over 3,000 miles of interlocking streams. (See Enclosures (1) and (2).)

B. Civil

The original settlers of the Rung Sat date back to the 18th Century when some survivors from the war with the Chan Lap were resettled in the Can Gio area. Also, later in 1802, some came from Phu Quoc Island near the Cambodian border and established the three hamlets of Can Thanh Village.

During the early stages of French Colonialism, the French were responsible for relocating some religious sects which were at the time causing them trouble. As the result two settlement areas known as Thanh An and Dong Hoa were formed from Cau Dia people from Tay Ninh Province.

Because of being sparsely populated in relation to the surrounding area, the French continued to encourage settlement in the Rung Sat. There is evidence of many areas being settled at one time, which are now deserted.

The primary occupations of these people, now, is fishing (to include catching shrimp), woodcutting, (some of which is used to make charcoal), paddy farming (done at Binh Khanh, An Thoi Dong, Ly Nhon, and Can Thanh), fruit farming (done at Dong Hoa) and trading (Tam Thom Hiep being the most active located on the civilian water route from Vung Tau to Saigon.)

As the result of many refugees and transients, (mostly fisherman and woodcutters from the delta) District Chiefs have a difficult time in making the people adhere to regulations concerning curfews and restricted areas. Although no recent census is available, the total population is believed to be in excess of 18,000.

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C. Military

During World War II the Japanese patrolled the Sea and Long Tau River leading to Saigon. After this war many of the Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and fled to the village assuming a Vietnamese identity to avoid persecution.

The French Navy then took control and controlled the Rung Sat with one French River Assault Group which is basically the same as a Vietnamese RAG with the addition of 2-LCU's, 1-LSL and a LCT (Repair Ship). The French also, later (about 1949), built numerous forts or outposts on the Long Tau at YS 013747, YS 042746, YS 042714, YS 008702, YS 030656, and YS 055633. This was to stop pirates and robbers who preyed on ships and boats moving to Saigon.

In 1954 the Binh-Xuyen (a Political Party consisting of many profiteers) lost favor with the government and fled from Gia Dinh and Cholon to the Rung Sat. They built a camp at the only true high ground in the Rung Sat (a small hill about 20 meters high, mostly rock) called Gieng Chua (YS 166653). In battles against the Binh Xuyen in the vicinity of YS 020600 and at their base camp site they were defeated by Air Force, Navy, and Infantry Troops under the Ngo Dinh regime.

At that time the two districts, Quang Xuyen and Can Gio, were part of Long An Province. A few years later, Can Gio District was transferred to the control of Phuoc Tuy (until recently the VC in this district still were under the control of the VC in Baria).

On 8 June 1962 the Vietnamese Government recognized the Long Tau as the main shipping channel to Saigon and formed the Rung Sat Special Zone establishing a headquarters at An Thoi Dong (now Quang Xuyen District Hdq), under the adjutant of the 32nd tactical zone. In 1963 both Quang Xuyen and Can Gio were put under the administrative control of Bien Hoa Province.

In 1964 the Rung Sat Special Zone (which the Vietnamese call "Dac Khu Rung Sat") was assigned to the Vietnamese Navy where the military control has remained until now.

In 1965 the administrative and logistic control once again changed; this time to Gia Dinh province, as is the case to date.

Starting with only two Regional Force Companies in 1962, the friendly forces have been increased until there are now a total of 13 RF Companies, 2 RAG's, a U. S. Minesweeper Detachment, U. S. Navy Helo Detachment, and U. S. River Patrol Sections which are present at all times.

Viet Cong activity began in the early 1950's, then known as the Viet Minh. Under the disguise of Nationalism, to overthrow the French, the Viet Minh drew rapid support and popularity with many Vietnamese. For many years they have continued to build well concealed bases with bunkers and trenches without causing much alarm as they were generally inactive until 1965.

Until July of 1966, the VC in the Rung Sat were under control of outside elements with no central control. Southern Quang Xuyen District VC, south of Ly Nhon, belonged to Go Cong. From the Cat Lai north, the VC which were west of the Long Tau belonged to Can Giuoc District of Long An Province. The area of Quang Xuyen around Tam Thon Hiep (east of the Long Tau) belonged to the Bien Hoa VC control. All of Can Gio District was under the VC headquarters element near Baria in Phuoc Tuy Province.

In April of 1966 CONSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam, which the VC claim is the legal government) approved the Rung Sat as a Special Military Region to be known as D-10. The forming of D-10 actually began in July of 1966 and has progressed rapidly to what was known as "Doan-10" or "Group-Ten". However, in late December 1967 a VC rallier disclosed that a reorganization of the D-10 area was in progress. Currently the Rung Sat Special Zone is under control of the VC Sub Region K-4, but, due to the type of terrain in this area the VC are considering the possibility of a special coastal district independent of sub-region K-4.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

A. General

For many years portions of the Rung Sat were considered practically unpenetratable and therefore not feasible for ground operations. The VC also had announced that the Rung Sat was therefore a "Safe Area", and with the exception of an occasional air strike which might accidentally hit their Base Camp, felt very secure.

Two things of major significance changed this. The first was defoliation. Initially it was carried out along the banks of the Long Tau (1965) and later in many other areas which were used predominately as Base Areas for VC. (Late 1966 and early 1967). Second, there were two major ground operations which proved that ground operations against the VC could be successful. The first was conducted by Vietnamese Regional Force Troops who were under the command of and supported by the Vietnamese Navy. The second operation was conducted by U. S. Marines in April 1966 called operation "Jack Stay". Numerous areas deep in both Can Gio and Quang Xuyen Districts were penetrated resulting in many VC Bases being destroyed and large supply caches captured or destroyed. The lesson-learned in these operations provided the key to many subsequent successful operations by both Vietnamese and U. S. Forces.

B. Weather

1. Climatic Conditions

There are two climatic seasons in the Rung Sat Special Zone: A wet season, which extends from May through October, and a dry season, which extends from December through March. April and November are transitional months.

In September and October heavy thunder storms with winds to 40 knots will reduce visibility, and preclude any kind of air support during the period of these storms. Also during this period of heavy precipitation, if coupled with a period of normal yearly high cycle of tides, there may be

complete flooding of all the Rung Sat. These are known as Nip or Bore tides and may reach 15 feet in height.

The dry season favors friendly operations since it rarely rains from December to March. With the exception of an early morning ground fog, the skys are mostly clear, enabling us to get aerial photography of good quality in a short period of time. Air support for operations will not be hindered by the weather during this period.

The temperature year around is fairly constant being in the 90's most every day and dropping to the 70's each night. The dry season is a little cooler. The humidity is always near 80% in the rainy season but drops to as low as 20% during the dry season.

2. Light Data and Its Effects

As the result of being near the equator (10 Degrees 30 Minutes) there is little change in the length of days from winter to the summer months, therefore the sun will rise and set at nearly the same time each day.

The moon phase and times of rise and set are extremely important to the VC, concerning his movement. During periods of heavy ambush pressure by Free World Forces he will hesitate to travel when there is a moon present and this also holds true concerning his crossings of the Cua Soi Rap or Long Tau Rivers if patrolling of these rivers are heavy.

3. Tide

The average high tide varies with the moon phase each month. During the high cycle it will be about 11½ feet. (If not influenced by heavy rain) and during the low cycle around 10 feet for the daily high. There are two highs and two lows each day normally coming about 6 hours 25 minutes apart but at times these vary greatly. It is recommended that an accurate tide table of Cap St. Jacques (mouth of Long Tau River) be used and then add the conversion factor for the specific area of interest.

At low tide many small streams are dry and larger rivers and streams present high steep banks. The rapid currents (up to 8 knots) during filling and draining of these tidal flats make small streams dangerous for troop crossing except at the lull of a high or low. Since perhaps 85% of this area is under-water at high tide, movement is slow and frequently noisy. Friendly troops placed as ambushes along streams often find themselves waist deep in water for at least half the ambush period due to the tidal effect.

Since the water effected by tide contains from 9 to 15 parts salt per million, equipment is prone to rapid oxidation.

C. Terrain

1. General

The Rung Sat Special Zone, which lies about 20 miles SSE of Saigon, is the area south of Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province, west of Phuoc Tuy Province (known as Baria), and east of Long An and Go Cong Provinces. The

Rung Sat is a large poorly drained tidal swamp covered primarily with Mangrove and Nipa Palm and includes small areas of brushwood and rice paddies. This area is covered by a large network of rivers and small streams (approximately 3 times the number indicated on the 1:25,000 Picto Map Supplement). The soil composition with very few exception consists of perpetually wet sticky mud with a varying degree of firmness. None of the area is suited for any type of vehicular movement. The only mode of transportation which can be utilized is boat or helicopter. Due to constant dampness (wet feet and clothing) troops operating in this terrain for a period in excess of 48 hours will frequently have "immersion foot" or "severe chills".

Defoliation has helped air observation in many areas but due to the Air Force only using "half strength" defoliant in some areas it has only been partially effective. An air recon of the area of operation to see the extent of defoliation, if any, is therefore recommended for all areas in the Rung Sat.

2. Mangrove

Mangrove areas are mixed with many other broad leafed hardwoods. These areas are also the wettest in the jungle being flooded at each high tide with water from 6 inches to 4 feet deep. Cross-country movement is further hindered by soft sticky mud and by the prop and knee roots which grow out of the mangrove trees. These roots which are usually about 3/4" in diameter grow out of the main trunk (normally 3 to 6 inches in diameter and 3 to 10 meters high) and because they grow horizontal from 1 to 6 meters off the ground in conjunction with heavy vegetation and tidal debris, they frequently form almost impassable barriers.

The mud characteristic of these areas is very soft, and a person walking may sink in it from 6 inches to 3 feet. Hence traveling as light as possible is an absolute must.

3. Nipa Palm (Cha La)

The Nipa Palm area of the Rung Sat is of major importance to the VC since it is the area of preference for establishing Base Camps.

The Nipa usually grows on higher ground which only occasionally floods at high tide. The soil, although muddy in nature, is fairly firm to walk on and usually drains well. Small streams in these areas usually have steep banks and it is not uncommon to find these streams as deep as they are wide.

Nipa Palms grow on a single trunk or stem and usually are 3 to 6 inches in diameter and 20 to 30 feet tall. Only the very top of each tree has a green umbrella type foliage which of course provides for excellent cover from air observation. Ground observation is better in these areas than any other type area except for paddy or completely defoliated areas along the long Tau. Visibility is usually 5 to 15 meters on the ground varying with the amount of dead branches hanging down from these tree.

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Each branch has many spikes or thorns which may become bothersome for night movement by foot.

4. Brushwood

For the most part these are jungle areas which have been partly or totally cut off in the past only to grow back again. Much of these areas are covered by 7 or 8 feet tall firns and water palm having no trunks which grow along stream banks. Occasional large trees are also present and evidence of past woodcutting by natives is prevalent.

Movement by foot troops is slow due to very poor visability and the presence of the fern type vegetation causes other problems. They are dry and brittle, thus any movement causes excessive noise.

5. Paddy Areas

During the "rainy season" they are continually flooded, and foot troops crossing these paddies will sink about 14 inches in the mud. Extreme caution should be exercised when using dykes which are not used regularly by civilians as they may be booby trapped.

During the "dry season" many paddies dry up and the mud becomes very hard on top, and many cracks appear. Although the surface appears to have a solid firmness it will not support items such as artillery, etc.

III. ENEMY SITUATION

A. Composition

The VC felt that the Rung Sat Special Zone was of great importance and thus, in April 1966, made the decision to establish a special MR (Military Region) and called it T-10. The initial formation took place in July of 1966 and was directed by a Senior Colonel (Luong-Van-Nha) who had previously served as CO of an artillery regiment, and as Assistant Division Commander of the VC 5th Division.

The nucleus of this organization was Group 43 (an Eng. Bn. in the RSSZ) and gradually other units and personnel were transferred to T-10 from Long An, Baria, Bien Hoa and North Vietnam. Control was also given to T-10 over the local Guerrillas and the District VC Headquarters were abolished.

The area covered by T-10 control included all of the Rung Sat Special Zone (Quang Xuyen and Can Gio Districts) as well as the south and eastern part of Nhon Trach District.

In October of 1966 the name was changed to Doan-10 (Group 10). The last major annexation of territory was in February of 1967 when the jungle area west of route 15 in Phuoc Tuy Province including the island of Long Son was taken over.

1. Main Force

Doan-10 is a regimental type command and is further broken down into Military Area "A" and "B" (Khu "A" and Khu "B") with Area "A" being north-east of the Long Tau River and "B" laying to the southwest of the Long Tau. Each of these areas have a Battalion type command group, and 3 main force sapper/infantry Companies. These companies are composed largely of North Vietnamese troops sent to SVN on a three year enlistment. They have been well trained giving them a formidable strike capability which includes Recoilless Rifles, Rockets, Mortars, .50 and .30 Cal. Machine Guns, and Watermines as weapons of warfare.

Doan-10 Headquarters Element is supported by six staff sections which are the Military Staff, Political, Rear Service, Medical, Security and Recon and Signal Section. See enclosure (3) for complete organizational structure of Doan-10.

2. Guerrilla

A viet cong village infrastructure with its supporting military arm, the local guerrilla platoon, exists for nearly every New Life Village in the Rung Sat. They are usually situated in a secret base camp within 5 kilometers of our government controlled villages.

The function of each is to provide the ready made leaders and necessary control force in the government forces relinquish their control of these villages. If this would happen all the government or people chosen leaders would be assassinated and this infrastructure would then take over with the guerrillas providing the armed control. See enclosure (4) for VC Village Organization.

The only VC organization working under cover in our controlled areas are the Secret Self Defence Cells (Intelligence and Contacts). Each cell usually contains three members and there is usually one cell for each New Life Hamlet. The village leader normally get his orders from the Doan-10 Political Section. The mission or assignment consists of civil and military proselyting, propaganda, robbery (alleged taxing), and procurement of supplies for which to take care of their own unit (the latter is usually paid for with money taken from these same people for VC taxation).

The guerrilla occasionally will have ambushes set out for RF or PF troops, but these are usually not successful due to poor planning and lack of determination. These guerrillas also harrass the New Life Village and military outposts with small arms fire or rifle grenades.

3. Commo/Liaison

Three main routes cross the Rung Sat from west to east. The northern route which now is the most active is the most difficult to cover as it runs over many different canals and rivers from the Ong Keo in Nhon Trach District to the Huong Bau or Kinh Lo in Can Giuoc District of Long An.

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A sub-route also cuts south from the Rach La to supply the VC in Area "B".

Main crossing points are at XS 946758, XS 944747, and XS 954732 for the Sio Rap and at XS 982785, XS 992764, and XS 015754 for the Long Tau.

The central route runs along the Rach Don and Ta Ca Dao Rivers with crossing points at XS 954693 on the Soi Rap and XS 013684 on the Long Tau.

B. Strength

1. Main Force

The strength of the combat main force elements (not including staff and support elements) has undergone several periods of fluctuation since the initial introduction of Engineer Bn. C225 (AKA C255, AKA Doan-43) into the Rung Sat in 1965. It is believed that they started with a strength of near 300 men in their 3 Engineer Companies but by the time T-10 was formed probably not more than 150 remained. One of these companies was completely rebuilt as the result of suffering many losses and defections.

Using this as a base and getting numerous recruits from Can Giuoc District of Long An as well as other recruits from Nhon Trach, Baria, and North Vietnam this force has now been built up by Doan-10 to 2 Bns., a force of approximately 500 well trained VC Main Force combatants. Additional support and staff personnel added to this gives Doan-10 700 personnel.

2. Guerrilla

Combatant Guerrillas number 150 which include Phu Hau, Phuoc Khanh and Long Son. They are in very small platoons or squads averaging about 15 per each VC village. For the most part the village infrastructures are not armed and do not take part in the guerrilla activities.

3. Collective Unit Strengths

Group 10 has a total strength of 500 not including the guerrillas. The guerrilla and his village infrastructive strength 213 which puts 984 personnel under the control of Doan-10.

Strength of the Commo/Laison units are estimated at 80 and the strength for Long An VC at 134, is taken from old documents. This gives a total of 1198 VC in our area of interest.

C. Committed Forces

1. General Mission

Doan-10 was given three general missions which all units under its control are committed to support. These are as follows:

- a. Interdict shipping on the Long Tau River.
- b. Hold three Allied Battalions in the Rung Sat Special Zone at all times.
- c. Make the Rung Sat Special Zone a "safe area" for all VC.

2. Main Force Elements

Each of the seven (7) Sapper/Infantry companies has been assigned an area of responsibility and mission which are as follows:

a. D-1 Company has the responsibility for attacking shipping on the Long Tau from the Upper Dong Tranh (YS 015750) to Phuoc Khanh Area (XS 970790) and to support the Phu Hau and Phuoc Khanh guerrillas in making that a "safe area" for VC troops operating in the area. Special missions such as attacking Nha Be POL or Navy Base may also be assigned.

b. D-2 Company previously had the Long Tau responsibility from Don Tac Ong Nghia (YS 010700) to Tan Thanh (YS 130585). Although this company does not normally support local guerrillas it has been told to provide a "safe area" for VC extending roughly from the 00 grid line East to the Long Tau and from the Rach Don south to the Cat Lai and Ong Tien. However, in April of 1968 D-2 moved from this area north to the D-10 area which is just above the upper Dong Tranh to support and conduct operations. This move also provided an easier means of re-supply. It is anticipated that D-2 will move down to their former area of operations in the near future.

c. D-3 and D-5 Companies have the Long Tau River from the upper Dong Tranh (YS 015750) to Don Tac Ong Nghia (YS 010700) and "safe area" responsibility roughly north of the 70 grid line to include Ba Gioi, and the Group 10 Headquarters Area (the area east of the Rach La at XS 053780).

d. D-4 Company has two widely separated areas of responsibility, one being that of the Northern Vam Sat which allegedly includes the laying of watermines in the Soi Rap, and the other being that southern portion of Can Gio District which lays west of the Song Nha Be (southern Long Tau) and south of the Ong Tien river. This company moved from the Vam Sat area to Can Gio area in June of 1967, and is presently supporting the guerrillas of Dong Hoa and Can Thanh.

e. D-6 Company has spent most of its time supporting the Ly Nhon guerrilla unit, however, recently it received instructions to send a platoon to aid the Binh An Guerrillas in the Rach La Area. Another Platoon is known to be in the vicinity of XS 965670. They have a secondary mission to provide transportation for the Units in area "B" west of the Long Tau.

f. D-7 Company has until recently been involved in a secondary mission of proving transportation for units of area "A" east of the Long Tau. It has the responsibility for the Song Dau River south of Tan Thon Hiep and the area east to the Thi Via River.

3. Guerrillas

With two exceptions, the name of the guerrilla element will denote its area of responsibility and activity. The guerrilla unit for Tam Thon Hiep is called Xom Thit. The other is the Binh An guerrilla unit which is located

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in the Rach La Area (vic XS 980725) who cover both An Thoi Dong and Binh Khanh.

D. Reinforcements

1. General

As the result of pressure against VC base areas by ground sweeps and air strikes the VC have gone to the use of Platoon size and squad size base camps. Communications within most companies (by means of the HT-1 AM type radio) is good and attacks on shipping or other targets of opportunity may involve coordinated company size elements.

On the night of 2 August 1967 the VC initiated a two company coordinated mortar and recoilless-rifle attack against Nha Be POL facilities and Navy Base.

And again on 22 February 1968 two VC Companies conducted an attack on Can Gio District Headquarters. To date this is the largest known force massed for any single attack.

It is believed, because of their organizational structure and control, that the VC of Doan-10 could mass for an attack or reinforce with up to a Battalion size element (3 companies).

E. Recent Significant Activities

1. Mining and Attempted Minings

Commencing with the sinking of the Baton Rouge Victory on 23 August 1966 the frequency of minings has been steadily reduced from a rate of about 2 each week to one attack every two months. Both command detonated and contact mines are preferred. The reason for the reduction in mining is contributed to two factors. One is the increased efficiency of operations by the U. S. Mine Sweep Detachment and the other is a known shortage of these mines in the VC Sapper/Infantry Companies. To replace the absence of mining attempts with watermines, the VC have employed recoilless-rifles, DH-10 Claymores, 107 and 122mm rockets and recently a connected 122 rocket which has been named by U. S. personnel the TCM or Trash Can Missile. Employment of these various weapons has not really been successful, however the VC are more successful adapt with the .75 RR.

2. Harrassing Attacks

By harrassing attacks we refer to small attacks on New Life Villages and military bases or outposts. Almost every week has one or two such attacks with no set pattern as to where or when the VC will hit next. Both minings/heavy weapons attacks on river craft and harrassing attacks tends to increase in tempo just prior to every Vietnamese held election and on or before VC celebrated holidays.

3. Terrorism

This form of VC activity does not occur very often in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The incidents we have had are primarily aimed at local officials or Chieu Hais' who have a very high mortality rate.

4. Robbing and Other Contacts With Civilians

Civilian's contact with the VC is frequently made in three different areas. People from Binh Khanh and Phuoc Khanh usually make contact with the local VC in the Rach La Area (Binh An) while fishing and woodcutting. The people of Tom Thon Hiep and Tac Ong Nghia usually encounter the VC while carrying wood in areas assigned by the Quang Xuyen District. Fisherman from Tam Thanh and Can Thanh Villages usually meet local VC when fishing the Bai Tien and Toc Lo Voi which is restricted to such activity.

The main purpose of these contacts is to procure food, water, tobacco etc., or to propagandise the people into supporting there position against the Vietnamese government. In recent cases the VC have taken numerous sampans from the Vietnamese workers and have employed them in movement of supplies.

5. Operational Contacts

While conducting ground operations Vietnamese and American Forces have made many contacts with the Viet Cong and in all but one case the VC have, after firing a few rounds with small arms and perhaps one claymore mine, fled their camps within five minutes from initial contact. The one case, where contact was maintained for about 4 hours, happened at dusk when U. S. ground troops threatened a VC hospital which contained many patients.

Group 10 has become quite concerned over their troops abandoning good bases, food and other supplies, and has recently issued an order to prepare all base camps for a "Battle Area" and directed that they disperse caches of supplies and ammo. Recent contact with a Main Force Platoon base camp indicated they still prefer to run rather than fight.

F. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

1. Personnel

Many of the leaders are resented by the soldiers under them. The reason seeming to be their attitude toward their subordinates. Some South Vietnamese resent the fact that the North Vietnamese hold most of the key positions of leadership and man all of the key weapons.

2. Intelligence

The greatest asset the VC have is the accumulation of good intelligence but this is off set to some degree by under estimating our reaction and superior fire power. Besides keeping the Long Tau River under constant surveillance they have infiltrated most of our bases to include the Rung Sat Headquarters at Nha Be.

3. Operations

Movement to a VC chosen battle area is by sampan until they are within one or two kilometers of the objective. Units then proceed on foot to designated position. Each operation is carefully planned and well rehearsed.

Deployment is usually based on the key weapon being used in the attack. In the case of a command detonated watermine, the watermine section, of about 8 men, is all that is needed and may or may not be supported by a squad or two of infantry. Rocket attacks whether, B-40, B-41, or B-50 do not require additional personnel either but normally have a platoon and sometimes an entire company will participate in a coordinated effort. These crew served weapons are in the center of the designated "Battle Area" and are flanked by infantry and machine guns.

The withdrawal is almost always initiated within five minutes of the commencement of the attack and the crew served weapons are always the first to be withdrawn. Next comes the machine guns and last the rifleman. Withdrawals are made to predesignated areas from 500 to 1000 meters away from the "Battle Area" to well camouflaged bunker positions or one of dense cover from air observation. They then will normally wait until darkness before returning to their base area again by sampan.

4. Logistics

Companies usually are responsible for getting their own food supplies through utilization of their own sampans. Rice is supplemented by fish, shrimp, and crabs which are caught by special work details.

Companies D6 and D7 have the additional duty of transporting strategic supplies within their respected "Khu" (area) and make liaison with each other at or near the Long Tau. As the result of most operations in 1966 large caches of rice were destroyed which now necessitates more frequent resupply and over greater distances for most units in area "B".

Most clothing, equipment, and factory produced ordnance and weapons comes to Doan-10 from Group 84, a rear service group located in Phuoc Tuy and Bien Hoa Provinces. D8, an ordnance company, produces in the Rung Sat such ordnance as claymores, grenades, mines and mortar rounds as well as repairing small arms and reloading small arms ammunition.

5. Civil Affairs

Main force elements for the most part avoid contact with civilians. The few contacts that civilians have had with main force units have resulted in the loss of their sampans and supplies or at best being told to leave the area and not to cut wood or fish.

Local force guerrillas, however, make frequent contact with the local population in following a program of proselyting or propagandizing the

people. These VC also rely on the civilians for the majority of their supplies.

IV. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

A. Enumeration

1. To attack ships and boats in the Long Tau River with contact and command detonated watermines, 57 and 75 recoilless rifles, B-40 and B-41 and B-50 rocket launchers, 107 and 122mm rockets, .30 and .50 caliber machine guns and small arms at anytime up to a 2 company coordinated force.
2. To attack troop carrying boats and patrol boats on other waterways other than the Long Tau with command detonated watermines and heavy weapons not to exceed a force of two companies.
3. To attack and over-run any New Life Village or Military Outpost in the Rung Sat Special Zone with a force up to a Bn. (3 companies) in strength.
4. To mortar or use any other indirect fire weapons (i.e., 75 RR) to hit Nha Be POL storage area, Nha Be Navy Base, or any other target in the Rung Sat Special Zone on any night with a force of up to one (1) Bn. and up to 150 rounds in any one attack.
5. To be able to defend his base areas up to a period of 4 hours in daylight and 12 hours at night with a company size force against any kind of coordinated attack.
6. To be able to cross the Long Tau and Soi Rap Rivers at night or during rain squalls with up to ten sampans or junks which could be used for resupply or to move troops.
7. To infiltrate Nha Be U. S. Naval Base or the Vietnamese Naval Base and Rung Sat Headquarters compound area and place a claymore or other demolitions against a predesignated target, with the use of indigenous personnel or a sapper squad at night.

B. Analysis

In examining the enemy, we find he is well trained and has much versatility. To often, because he has not done something in the past we believe he is not capable of doing it in the future, when in fact other motives or factors may have influenced his past activities.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. Vulnerabilities

1. All Viet Cong in the Rung Sat become extremely vulnerable to any kind of air attack once they have left their base areas or battle areas where bunkers and prepared positions exist.

2. While using small streams of less than 100 meters in width they very susceptible in being ambushed by any unit who is quiet and has patience.

3. When attempting to cross any large river such as the Long Tau, Soi Rap, or Dong Tranh the VC can be easily detected and destroyed or captured.

4. It is also believed that they are vulnerable to concentrated search and destroy operations when confined to small areas which have river boundaries.

B. Probable course of Action

1. General

Periodic action or attacks can be expected and these will probably run in high and low activity cycles as in the past. These will probably be timed with the numerous VC and North Vietnamese Holidays or against specific GVN sanctioned activities such as elections.

2. Waterway Interdiction

They can be expected to make several attacks against shipping each month. These maybe in the form of several in one day at widely separated areas to kick off a specific campaign period. Less use of watermines is anticipated in the future with the emphasis being placed on recoilless rifle and rocket attacks.

Occasional sniper attempts and claymore attacks from the banks are anticipated against MSB's and PBR's.

3. Harrassing Attacks

New Life Villages and outposts will be harrassed from time to time with rifle grenades, claymores, small arms including machine guns, and 60mm mortars. The duration of these attacks will rarely last more than 20 minutes and normally no physical penetration of the perimeters will be made.

4. Defense Of Base Areas

Although directions have been issued to all subordinated units of Group 10 to prepare their base camps for defense and make their "Battle Areas" little change is anticipated in their present tactics. They will probably fire a claymore or heavy weapon once or twice, shoot a few rounds of small arms to include automatic weapons, and break contact almost immediately leaving their camp, supplies, and well prepared defense positions.

5. Movement

Movement will continue to be primarily by sampan using small streams when ever possible. The largest anticipated unit moving at one time in a group is a Platoon (approx. 30 men) and the usual number will be one or two sampans with from 2 to 7 Viet Cong aboard.

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6. Mortar and Recoilless Rifle Attacks against Nha Be

The POL facility, as well as the Vietnamese and U. S. Naval Base areas offer lucrative targets for the VC. We can expect frequent attacks of RR and rockets against these targets.

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AREA STUDY QUANG XUYEN DISTRICT TO RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE AREA STUDY

1. GEOGRAPHY

a. Location and Size. Quang Xuyen is the western district of the Rung Sat and occupies an area of approximately 30,728 hectares (353 square kilometers). The land mass itself extends 26 kilometers north to south and 19 kilometers east to west at its extremes.

b. Physical Boundaries

(1) North. The Long Tau River from XS 9480 to YS 0175, the Dong Tranh River to YS 1272.

(2) East. Dong Tranh River from YS 1272, the Long Tau River to YS 0563, Dan Lay River to YS 0460 and the Mui Nai and Dong Tranh Rivers to YS 0546.

(3) South. South China Sea

(4) West. Soi Rap River

c. Nature of Terrain. Quang Xuyen is almost 90 percent mangrove swamp of varying density, with the remaining 10 percent being rice paddies surrounding the villages of Binh Khanh and Ly Nhon. Defoliation has cleared many areas to some extent, but dead and dried vegetation is still dense.

d. Terrain Features

(1) Roads. There are no roads in Quang Xuyen District.

(2) Bridges. There are no bridges in Quang Xuyen District.

(3) Waterways. Waterways provide the most feasible means of transportation. The major waterways are as follows:

Soi Rap River	XS 9480 to XS 8948
Long Tau River	XS 9480 to XS 0350
Vam Sat River &	XS 9264 to XS 0355
Cat Lai	
Rach La River	XS 9573 to XS 9972
	where 3 main estuaries
	flow into the Long Tau
	River at YS 0373, YS 0473
	and YS 0174

e. Aircraft Landing Sites

(1) Fixed Wing. There are no fixed wing landing sites in the District.

(2) Rotary Wing. Rotary Wing landing sites are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Size</u>
An Thoi Dong	XS 961711	40m X 40m
Tac Ong Nghia	YS 002702	12m X 12m

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Enclosure (1)

2. SOCIOLOGY

a. Population Centers. Quang Xuyen District has a total population of 10,886 living in 4 villages composed of 11 hamlets. Names, sizes, location and the 1968 population of the villages and hamlets are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Size (hectares)</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Coordinate</u>	<u>Population</u>
An Thoi Dong	3120	An Hoa	XS 964711	1551
	1400	An Binh	XS 964703	990
Binh Khanh		An Nghia	YS 008703	1299
	2852	Binh Phuoc	XS 945790	1644
	2397	Binh Truong	XS 955795	1964
	1292	Binh Truong	XS 939784	1102
Ly Nhon	2088	Binh Thanh	XS 945741	527
	629	Ly Trung	XS 938577	479
	570	Ly Thuan	XS 938582	295
Tam Thon Hiep	675	Tam An	YS 067697	379
	1500	Tam Phuoc	YS 064700	656

b. District Government Organization. The District Chief is responsible to Gia Dinh Province for the political and administrative control of the populace and to the Commander Rung Sat Special Zone for military control and operations. All district offices are located at An Thoi Dong Village (XS 947705).

c. Political Affiliations. Information not available.

d. Religious Affiliations. The percentage of the population of the district belonging to various religions is as follows:

Buddist	53%
Cao Dai	26%
Ancestor Worship	20%
Catholic	.2%
Protestant	.3%
Other	.5%

e. Ethnic Groups. Information not available.

f. Occupations. The percentage of the population engaged in various occupations is as follows:

Farming	65%
Woodcutting	18%
Fishing	10%
Misc.	7%

g. Refugees. Refugees located within the district are located as follows:

An Thoi Dong Village	200 families	1068 persons
Binh Thanh	89 families	479 persons
Ly Nhon	15 families	81 persons
Tam Thon Hiep	300 families	2000 persons
An Nghia Refugee Camp	120 families	640 persons

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3. ECONOMY

a. Agriculture and Livestock

(1) Rice. 3,781 hectares have been cultivated for rice and yields 6,372 tons.

(2) Livestock. Approximately 542 water buffalo, 3137 pigs and 19,175 ducks and chickens are raised in the district. These are mostly raised by individual families and are for their own use.

b. Industry. There is no active industry in Quang Xuyen Province.

4. PUBLIC FACILITIES

a. Educational Facilities. Educational Facilities for each village are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>No. of Schools</u>	<u>Classrooms</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Students</u>
Binh Khanh	2	13	14	1156
An Thoi Dong	1	8	10	396
Ly Nhon	1	2	1	80
Tan Thon Hiep	1	3	2	111

b. Electrification. The only electrical equipment in the district are 2 30kw generators at Binh Khanh and An Thoi Dong.

c. Sanitary Conditions

(1) Sanitation Facilities. There are no sanitation facilities designed for water purification, sewage treatment, garbage disposal or vector control.

(2) Sources of Potable Water. During the rainy season water is collected. During the dry season potable water must be transported in by boat.

d. Welfare Facilities. None

e. Medical Facilities. The district has the following medical facilities:

<u>Village/Hamlet Facility</u>	<u>Type Medical Personnel</u>
An Thoi Dong District Maternity Clinic	1 Health Chief 1 Midwife 1 Health Worker

Village Maternity Clinic under construction

An Hoa	1 Health Worker
An Binh	1 Health Worker
Ly Trung	1 Health Worker
Ly Thuah	1 Health Worker

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f. Communications

(1) Transportation. The only other form of transportation other than by foot is by boat. Travel between villages is usually by motorized sampan. Large ferries serve all villages and provide transportation to Vung Tau and Saigon.

(2) Electronic Facilities

(a) Radio

1. Radios in use in Quang Xuyen District have the following characteristics:

- a. TR-20 AM radio transmitter and receiver. Range 20 miles.
- b. TR-5 AM radio transmitter and receiver. Range 8 miles.
- c. HT-1 AM radio transmitter and receiver. Range 5 miles.

2. Civilian radios are located as follows:

<u>Village/Hamlet</u>	<u>TR-20</u>	<u>Type Radio</u> <u>TR-5</u>	<u>HT-1</u>
District Hqs.	5	1	2
An Thoi Dong			2
Binh Khanh	1		1
Tam Thon Hiep		1	1
Ly Nhon		1	
An Thanh			1

(b) Television. Locations of television sets within the District are:

<u>Village</u>	<u>No. of sets</u>
An Thoi Dong	2 - VIS Office
	1 - District Hqs
	1 - location unknown
Tam Thon Hiep	2
Kinh Khanh	1

(c) Telephones. There is no civilian telephone system.

(d) Newspapers. There is no newspaper published in Quang Xuyen.

5. GOVERNMENT FORCES

a. Regional and Popular Forces. Locations of RF and PF units are as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
999 RF Co.	Binh Khanh
117 RF Co.	Tam Thon Hiep

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<u>Unit (cont'd)</u>	<u>Location (cont'd)</u>
782 RF Co.	Ly Nhon
902 RF Co.	Tac Ong Nghia
601 RF Co.	Tac Ong Nghia
121 PF Plt.	Tac Ong Nghia
362 PF Plt.	Tac Ong Nghia

b. National Police. National Police are located as follows within the District:

District Police Hqs.

Police Chief	1
Deputy Police Chief	1
Radio Men	2
Office	3
Weapon & Ammo	1
Section	

An Thoi Dong Village:

Stationary Checkpoint	4
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Binh Khanh Village:

Stationary Checkpoint	5
(Binh Trung)	
Security force	12
Mobile Checkpoint	5

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AREA STUDY CAN GIO DISTRICT TO RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE AREA STUDY

1. GEOGRAPHY

a. Location and Size. Can Gio District is the eastern district of the Rung Sat Special Zone and occupies an area of approximately 35,190 hectares (450 square kilometers). The land mass itself extends 22 kilometers north to south and 14 kilometers east to west at its extremes.

b. Physical Boundaries. Can Gio District is bordered as follows:

(1) North. Tac Nuoc Hoi and Tac Cua Rivers from YS 1272 to YS 1769, then Go Gia River to YS 1771 and the Tac Ong Co River to YS 2073.

(2) East. Thi Vai and Cai Mep Rivers from YS 2073 to YS 2058.

(3) South. South China Sea.

(4) West. Dong Tranh River from YS 1272, the Long Tau River to YS 0563, Dan Xay River to YS 0460 and the Mui Nai and Dong Tranh Rivers to YS 0546.

c. Terrain Features.

(1) Roads. The only major road in the Rung Sat is in Can Gio District from Can Thanh Village (YS 164518) to Dong Hoa Village (YS 061477), a distance of about 13 kilometers. The VC have interdicted and virtually destroyed the road and it is presently unused.

(2) Bridges. There are no bridges over any of the major waterways. A few minor footbridges span small streams that intersect paths between villages and hamlets.

(3) Waterways. Waterways provide the most feasible means of transportation. The major navigable waterways are listed below:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
Nga Bay River	YS 104645 to YS 130570
Dong Tranh River	YS 120720 to YS 050470
Cai My Moi and Thi Vai Canals	YS 190590 to YS 200735
Go Gia River	YS 206638 to YS 177717
Dong Dinh River	YS 130545 to YS 105540

d. Aircraft Landing Sites.

(1) There are no fixed wing landing sites in the district.

(2) Rotary wing landing sites are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Composition</u>
Can Thanh	YS 165517	40m X 30m	Cement
Long Thanh	YS 098485	Abandoned	
Tan Thanh	YS 119584	20m X 20m	Earth
Thanh An	YS 170580	20m X 20m	Earth
Dong Hoa	YS 061475	10m X 10m	Cement

2. SOCIOLOGY

a. Population Centers. Can Gio District has a total population of 8,882 living in 5 villages which are composed of 10 hamlets. Long Thanh village was abandoned in 1966. Names, sizes, location and the 1967 population of the villages and hamlets are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Size (Hectares)</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Coordinate</u>	<u>Population</u>
Can Thanh	10035	Hung Thanh	YS 164518	2137
		Phong Thanh	YS 163516	1719
		Mieu Ba	YS 155508	573
Tan Thanh	7195	Tan Thuan	YS 115586	998
Thanh An	11420	Thanh Binh	YS 168581	624
		Thanh My	YS 166577	858
Dong Hoa	3487	Dong Tranh	YS 061477	896
		Dong Tien	YS 063475	1077
Long Thanh	3455	Long Hoa	YS 095485	Abandoned
		Long Phu	YS 094483	1966

b. District Government Organization. The District Chief is responsible to Gia Dinh Province for the political and administrative control of the populace and to the Commander Rung Sat Special Zone for military control and operations. All district offices are located at the District Headquarters compound in Can Thanh Village (YS 164518).

c. Political Affiliations. The percentage of population, by village, and political affiliation is as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Pro-SVN</u>	<u>Pro-Communist</u>	<u>Unknown</u>
Can Thanh	75%	15%	10%
Dong Hoa	80%	15%	5%
Thanh An	95%	5%	0%
Tan Thanh	75%	15%	10%

d. Religious Affiliations. The percentage of the population, by village, belonging to various religions are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Cao Dai</u>	<u>Buddhist</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Other</u>
Can Thanh	20%	75%	1%	4%
Tan Thanh	3%	95%	0%	2%
Thanh An	70%	29%	1%	0%
Dong Hoa	20%	50%	2%	28%
Long Thanh - Abandoned				

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e. Ethnic Groups. Approximately 3% of the population of Can Gio were originally from Central Vietnam, the remainder are native born South Vietnamese.

f. Occupations. The percentage of the population, by village engaged in various occupations are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Occupations</u>					
	<u>Rice</u> <u>Farmers</u>	<u>Garden</u> <u>Farmers</u>	<u>Fishermen</u>	<u>Woodcutters</u>	<u>Business</u>	<u>Other</u>
Can Thanh	3%	2%	80%	5%	10%	5%
Tan Thanh	0%	0%	25%	70%	5%	0%
Thanh An	0%	0%	45%	50%	5%	0%
Dong Hoa	0%	50%	40%	5%	5%	0%

g. Refugees. Except as listed below, all refugee locations previously reported have been absorbed by their respective villages and have established an occupation and household and are now a member of the village. Remaining refugee locations are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>No. of Refugees</u>	<u>Occupation</u>
Can Thanh	YS 113587	30	Fishing
Thanh An	YS 174587	50	Fishing
Dong Hoa	YS 099476	20	Fishing

3. ECONOMY

a. Agriculture and Livestock.

(1) Crops. Very little rice is grown in the district except along the southern coast. 15,000 square meters under cultivation for rice yields 2 tons annually, thus requiring imports to sustain local needs. 25,000 square meters is under cultivation for watermelons yielding 30 tons annually and is a major export of the district.

(2) Livestock. Approximately 200 pigs, 30 water buffalo and 2000 ducks and chickens are raised in the district. They are mostly raised by individual families and are for their own use.

b. Natural Resources

(1) Fish. Fish are abundant and the majority of the population are engaged in fishing. Each year many tons of fish, dried fish, lobsters and crab are exported.

(2) Wood. The dense vegetation provides excellent fire wood and 30 percent of the population is engaged in woodcutting. Enough is gathered each year for local use and is also a major export.

c. Industry. There is no active industry within the district. A nuoc mon factory and a charcoal factory in Can Thanh Village are inoperative.

4. PUBLIC FACILITIES

a. Educational Facilities. Educational Facilities for each village are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Primary School</u>	<u>Secondary School</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Classrooms</u>
Can Thanh	1	1	6	671	10
Tan Thanh	1		3	109	2
Thanh An	1		5	244	4
Dong Hoa	1		4	275	4
TOTAL	4	1	18	1299	20

b. Electrification. The status of electrification within each village is as follows:

<u>Village</u>	
Can Thanh	One public owned generator with 15kw capacity
Thanh An	None
Tan Thanh	One public owned generator with 8kw capacity
Dong Hoa	One public owned generator with 8kw capacity

c. Sanitary Conditions

(1) Sanitation Facilities. There are no sanitation facilities designed for water purification, sewage treatment, garbage disposal or vector control.

(2) Sources of Potable Water. During the rainy season rain water is collected. During the dry season potable water must be transported in by water boats.

(3) Major Common Diseases. The major common diseases are malaria, dysentery, skin disorders, vitamin deficiency, cholera, tuberculosis and typhoid.

d. Welfare Facilities. None

e. Medical Facilities. Medical Facilities for the district are as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>No. of Beds</u>	<u>No. of Medical Personnel</u>
Can Thanh	2 Aid Stations	0	7
	1 Maternity Clinic	4	2
Tan Thanh	No Aid Stations	0	1
	1 Maternity Clinic	2	1
Thanh An	No Aid Stations	0	1
	1 Maternity Clinic	3	1
Dong Hoa	1 Aid Station	0	1
	1 Maternity clinic	2	1

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Enclosure (2)

f. Communications

(1) Transportation. The only other form of transportation other than by foot is by boat. Travel between villages is usually by motorized sampan. Large ferries serve all villages and provide transportation to Vung Tau and Saigon.

(2) Electronic Facilities(a) Radio

1 Radios in use in Can Gio District have the following characteristics:

- a TR-20 AM radio transmitter and receiver. Range 20 miles.
- b TR-5 AM radio transmitter and receiver. Range 8 miles.
- c HT-1 AM radio transmitter and receiver. Range 5 miles.

2 Civilian radios are located as follows:

<u>Village</u>	<u>TR-20</u>	<u>TR-5</u>	<u>HT-1</u>
Can Thanh	2	2	2
Thanh An	0	1	2
Tan Thanh	0	1	1
Dong Hoa	0	1	2

3 District Headquarters and the RF and PF units are equipped with AN/CRC-9's and AN/PRC-10's.

(b) Television. Locations of television sets and uses are:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of sets</u>	<u>Uses</u>
Can Thanh	4	2 VIS Office 1 District Hqs 1 Public Market
Thanh An	1	VIS Office
Tan Thanh	1	VIS Office
Dong Hoa	1	VIS Office

(c) Telephones. There is no civilian telephone system.

(d) Newspapers. The only newspaper in the district is the Can Gio Newspaper published monthly in Can Thanh Village and which has a circulation of 1000.

5. GOVERNMENT FORCES

a. Regional and Popular Forces. Location and primary mission are as follows:


UNIT	PRIMARY BASE	OUTPOST	PRIMARY MISSION
361 RF Co.	YS 065477	YS 060476	Village and Hamlet Security
647 RF Co.	YS 166518		Security of LOC
783 RF Co.	YS 115590		Security of LOC
809 RF Co.	YS 155509		Village and Hamlet Security
875 RF Co.	YS 118585	YS 120584	Security of LOC
RF Intell Sqd.	YS 166518		Intelligence Collection
119 PF Plt.	YS 157515	YS 163514	District Security
		YS 157517	
		YS 158519	
120 PF Plt.	YS 169582		Village and Hamlet Security
121 PF Plt.	YS 112506	YS 115586	Village and Hamlet Security
		YS 117585	
122 PF Plt.	YS 062472	YS 064476	Village and Hamlet Security
		YS 062478	
123 PF Plt.	YS 164517		District Security
124 PF Plt.	YS 166576		Village and Hamlet Security

b. National Police. The 48 man National Police are utilized as follows:

- 2 - 2 man teams work with PBRs
 - 2 - 4 man mobile resources control
 - 2 - 2 man intelligence teams assigned to Thanh An and Tan Thanh Villages.
- The remainder of the police work from the District Police Headquarters in Can Thanh in routine police work - administration, population control, security.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART DOAN 10




Enclosure (3)

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VC VILLAGE ORGANIZATION



Enclosure (4)

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