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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96372

AVDE-47MH-:

29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Reference: AR 525-15, dated 26 January 1968

SECTION I
Operations: Significant Activities

1. (C) Introduction: The MOBILIZED FORCE (MRF) is a joint task force composed of RIVER FLOTILLA ONE and elements of the 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The Army element is composed of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Brigade, two infantry maneuver battalions, and a direct support artillery battalion. The Brigade's third maneuver battalion is used to provide a security force at DONG TAU. Each maneuver battalion spends approximately two months with the MRF and then approximately one month under the operational control of Task Force Funston at DONG TAU. The MRF normally engages in strike operations lasting normally from one to three days. During the period covered by this report, the MRF has operated in six provinces of the MEKONG DELTA: LONG XAN, GO CONG, DINH TAO, KIEN HO, VINH LONG, and PHAO DINH. The 2nd Brigade was involved in combat operations during the entire period with the exception of 13 to 14 February 1968, when the MRF

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moved from DONG Tan to CN THO and 4 to 6 March 1968, when the MRF returned to DONG Tan from CN THO. Training was conducted concurrently with combat operations and during periods when the battalions were rotated on base defense at Dong Tam or preparing for future operations.

2. (C) Organization:

   a. As previously stated in paragraph 1 of this report, the Army component of the Mobile Riverine Force consists of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two of its three maneuver battalions and a direct support artillery battalion minus one firing battery. The Brigade's third maneuver battalion is employed as a security force at DONG Tam Base - the 9th Infantry Division Forward Command Post. The third artillery battery is direct support to this battalion.

   b. Presently, the Brigade's organization for combat is the resultant of two significant factors: the first being insufficient quantity of berthing spaces on the MRF's barracks ships to accommodate a third maneuver battalion, and secondly, the Brigade's mission of providing DONG Tam Base with a battalion-size security element. Future (short-range) plans for the MRF provide for the addition of two Auxiliary Personnel Barracks, Ships (APB) and one Auxiliary Personnel Lighter (APL) to house and transport the Brigade's third maneuver battalion, along with additional berthing for two more River Assault Squadrons.

   c. The characteristics and nature of the MRF, as a "Mobile Striking Force", are such that both of the Brigade's maneuver battalions are fully committed in offensive initiatives against concentrations of sizable enemy units. In addition, one maneuver battalion is always tasked to provide one Infantry company to secure the MOBILE RIVERINE BASE while the second maneuver battalion is tasked to provide up to one company to secure the fire support base (FSB). With the active participation of a third maneuver battalion in MRF operations, the MRF would be capable of intensifying its strikes, with maximum tactical flexibility to sever enemy routes of withdrawal, fix and destroy him.

3. (C) Personnel and Administration:

   a. Personnel.

      (1) Unit Strength: The average assigned strength of major subordinate units of the Brigade during the period 1 February thru 15 April 1968 was:

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**UNIT** | **OFF** | **EM** | **TOT.**
---|---|---|---
HHC, 2nd Brigade | 27 | 115 | 142
3rd Bn, 47th Infantry | 37 | 697 | 734
4th Bn, 47th Infantry | 40 | 704 | 744
3rd Bn, 60th Infantry | 36 | 670 | 706
3rd Bn, 34th Artillery | 41 | 463 | 504

(2) The field maneuver strength of each infantry battalion was approximately three-fifths (3/5) of its assigned strength. The remaining personnel were involved in administrative and other matters such as hospitalization, details, R&R, leave, in transit, sick call, profiles and light duties as a result of wounds. To improve and increase the field maneuver strength, commanders and their staffs were directed to initiate aggressive administrative measures to improve their personnel management programs.

(3) Casualties as a result of hostile action for the period (1 February thru 15 April 1968) were as follows:

**UNIT** | **PERIOD** | **WH.** | **KH.** | **MR.**
---|---|---|---|---
3rd Bn, 47th Inf | 1 thru 29 Feb | 128 | 18 | 0
 | 1 thru 31 Mar | 71 | 8 | 1
 | 1 thru 15 Apr | 68 | 16 | 0
4th Bn, 47th Inf | 1 thru 29 Feb | 75 | 9 | 0
 | 1 thru 31 Mar | 108 | 10 | 0
 | 1 thru 15 Apr | 91 | 15 | 0
3rd Bn, 60th Inf | 1 thru 29 Feb | 197 | 22 | 0
 | 1 thru 31 Mar | 70 | 12 | 0
 | 1 thru 15 Apr | 44 | 7 | 0
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(4) Total casualties as a result of hostile action for
the period were:

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<td>117</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1</td>
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b. Administration.

(1) Awards and Decorations.

Number of Awards and Decorations recommended,

(pending approval)

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<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
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| 97 | 212 | OTH
| LM | BS | 59 |

(2) To minimize requirements for troops to return to
the division headquarters to solve personal and administrative problems,
representatives of the division special staffs were attached to the
Brigade to augment its administrative capabilities. The staff repre-
sentation consists of a postal section, finance team, public inform-
ation detachment and a re-enlistment NCO. Periodically, other teams
such as AG, J.G and IG are dispatched from division to serve the
troops as required.

(3) Insufficient administrative transportation
impaired the attainment of timely responses and services concerning
postal activities, administrative personnel movement, and other ad-
mnistrative requirements. Individuals participating in a five-day
out of country R&R could be expected to be absent from their unit
for a period of ten to thirteen days due to inadequate transportation
assets and/or arrangements. Close and extensive coordination is
presently being undertaken to reduce and subsequently eliminate
the noted problem areas.

(4) Health remained "excellent" throughout the period.

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The Brigade's malaria rate was extremely low and most of the man-days lost were due to foot problems. A surgical facility with a 30 bed capacity was installed on one of the barack ships (USS Colleton). This facility is used primarily as a medical clearing station for the MAF.

(5) Morale remained "excellent" throughout the period. Excellent living conditions coupled with outstanding leadership, and continuous success during combat operations contributed toward maintaining an extremely high state of morale throughout the command.

(6) Since the conception of the MOBILE DIVINE FORCE, numerous visitors (both military and civilian) have visited the MAF to view its features and facilities. To date, the majority of these visits have been beneficial to the MAF, in that recognition is given to its past accomplishments and present requirements. Personal resources were occasionally diverted from other missions in preparation for visitors; however, the diversion did not severely affect the accomplishment of their missions.

4. (c) Intelligence:

a. The enemy forces, order of battle and dispositions, prior to each combat operation of the Brigade are presented in paragraph eight of the Combat After Action Report attached as enclosures to this Operational Report.

b. During the reported period, the enemy continued to select the time, location and conditions for decisive combat engagements with friendly forces. He further demonstrated his will to accept combat only when he occupied well prepared defensive positions and/or during late periods in the afternoon. This reporting period was characterized by a significant increase in his employment of automatic weapons and in the calibers of direct and indirect fire weapons. Enemy raid type operations increased against isolated fire bases and district towns.

c. The Viet Cong's psychological warfare effort, that of recruiting and proselyting activities directed against the rural population, increased significantly, concurrently with his threats against major urban areas. Indications are that the enemy is concentrating on controlling the rural population.
d. Complete reorganization of enemy forces has also occurred during the period of this report. Intelligence indicates that all Main Force and Provincial Mobile Battalions have split into at least two elements. This, coupled with the increased recruiting efforts, has allowed him to increase his effective combat strength by approximately one-third, recovering the losses of the TET period. These troops, however, are not the equivalent caliber of those lost. It is interesting to note that District Companies are recently referred to as Battalions with the probable intention of creating an atmosphere of additional strength. In almost all cases, the strength of the company has not significantly increased. There have been numerous reports of NVA units operating or passing through Kien Tuong Province and massing along the Long N., Kien Tuong and Dinh Tuong border area. The enemy is attempting an economic strangulation of provincial towns and to disrupt the economic stability of the present GVN. There are increasing reports of underground political organizational meetings in order to prepare for the eventual take over of the government. More recently the enemy has been concentrating his efforts in training troops and resupply activities with less emphasis on stand-off rocket and mortar attacks. Also there has been an increase in swimmer/sapper and sapper activity.

e. Information and intelligence is exchanged liberally between all agencies and the Brigade by means of liaison officers, message traffic, and personal (staff) coordination and liaison. Significant intelligence information/material was obtained from the following sources: the 9th Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment located at Dong T.M., Prisoners of War (POW's) and sympathizers, 7th ARVN Division agent net, 525th MI Detachment, Field information reports from Naval Intelligence Liaison Office, spot reports, intelligence summaries, and electronic means. In most cases, information and intelligence were not particularly effective because they were not timely.

f. Enemy capabilities and limitations exhibited during the reporting period remain the same. The enemy retains the capability of conducting platoon and company size attacks on outposts and villages as well as battalion size attacks on District and Provincial Towns and military installations. He can also conduct stand-off mortar and rocket harassing attacks. Indications are infiltration, proselytizing and resupply activity will also continue on a large scale, in addition to the interdiction of major lines of communications. His desire to gain control of rural population
will continue to be a priority mission, even though he is not capable of maintaining the desired degree of political and military control. Despite his military and political objectives, the enemy remains vulnerable to massed artillery fire, aerial observation and electronic surveillance. Considering the enemy's capabilities it is thought that his possible courses of action will include continued recruitment, training and resupply activities, in addition to the initiation of attacks against minor targets in strength, intensifying harassment of major lines of communications and military installations. If at all feasible, the enemy will initiate an offensive on the same scale as his TET offensive.

5. (C) Combat Operations: A summation of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade operations is presented as follows:

a. Operation COBRA DO X.

   
   (2) Mission: To conduct riverine, search and clear, patrolling and interdictory operations before, during and after the TET Truce, in Giao Duc District, DINH TUONG Province, and My Linh District, East KIEN PHONG Province; to locate, fix and destroy enemy forces before and after the Truce period and to deny or disrupt enemy lines of communications during the Truce.
   
   (3) Location: DINH TUONG Province, and KIEN PHONG Province, Republic of Vietnam.
   
   (4) Commander: Colonel Bert A. David.
   
   (5) Forces involved:
   
   (a) US:

   1. 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.
   
   
   (b) Others: 7th ARVN Division

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(6) Concept and Execution:

(a) See Inclosure #2 (Combat Operations After Action Report CORON-DO X).

(b) The latter period for which this Combat After Action Report is prepared coincides with the beginning of the TET offensive. The Brigade operated during the offensive in three general areas: MY THO and its environs; the area around Cai Luy, and in VINH LONG and the areas south and west of the city. From 29 January thru 6 February, the Brigade accounted for 252 VC killed (by body count) at a loss of 11 US killed. On 31 January the Brigade, minus one company (which deployed to VINH LONG airfield) moved from the LCA RUONG to MY THO city. Following beach assaults on 1 February, the Brigade undertook to clear the western portion of the city of all enemy elements, and within thirty-six hours it had completed its mission. On the 2nd of February the Brigade moved into the Cai Luy area to cut off enemy escape routes and engage enemy elements moving into the 470 Base area. On 5 February it relocated to VINH LONG, where for the next three days, before returning to another search and clear mission north of MY THO, it engaged and destroyed major elements of the VC 306th MF Battalion, relieved enemy pressure on the city from the south, and reopened major waterways extending south from the TIEN GIANG River.

b. Operation CORON-DO XI.

(1) Dates: 13 February thru 4 March 1968.

(2) Mission: Conduct riverine, airmobile, search and sweep operations in C:I RANG District, PHONG DINH Province to locate fix and destroy elements of VC 303, 306 and 309 MF Battalion and Tuy Do Battalion I and II in zone.

(3) Location: PHONG DINH Province, Republic of Vietnam.

(4) Commander: Colonel Bert A. David.

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US:

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1. 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.


(b) Others: 21st RVN Division.

(6) Concept and execution:

(a) See Inclosure # 3 (Combat Operations after Operation CORONADO XI).

(b) Operation CORONADO XI, as originally conceived, would be conducted in three phases involving deployment, employment and redeployment of the Mobile Riverine Force. The first phase consisted of deployment of the MRF from Dong Tam to Can Tho, after which both Army and Navy elements were employed in tactical operations. The employment phase terminated with the redeployment phase; therefore the MRF returned to the Dong Tam area.

(c) During the period 13 February thru 3 March, the MRF anchored off Can Tho and the Brigade operated continuously in Can Tho District, Phong Dinh Province. Operation CORONADO XI began with the implementation of OPORD 15-68 and employment of waterborne (Riverine) insertions of Infantry units along the Bach Can Tho. During subsequent operations, the MRF engaged Viet Cong Main Force Battalions which had massed on the western periphery of Can Tho City. These operations accounted for 297 VC killed (by body count) resulting from a series of riverine and airmobile insertions and sweeps throughout difficult terrain west and southwest of the city. On 22 February the MRF made its deepest southern penetration into Phong Hiep District where it engaged headquarters and support elements of the VC MR III Headquarters along the Kinh Sa Nghien. In six hours of fighting the MRF accounted for 66 enemy killed at a loss of three wounded. Complete tactical surprise was achieved when elements of the VC company securing the MR III Headquarters were caught unaware by the MRF deployment some 20 miles inland from the Bassac River.

(d) On 24 February, the MRF employed the cordon-and-search technique to seal off the island of Cu Lao My, close to the eastern shore of the Bassac River, ten kilometers south of Can Tho. Large-scale Naval participation established the cordon by deploying River Assault Craft (RAC) around the island before dawn.
The Brigade's maneuver battalions (3-47th and 3-60th Infantry) were introduced into the northern and southern ends of the island, respectively; a complete search of island followed. The inhabitants were directed to go to one of two collection points established on the island. Before the operation was completed, 435 detainees were processed; two were classified as POW's and 23 were classified as civil detainees. In addition, 49 bunkers were destroyed. The joint cordon and search operation represented a significant innovation in MRF operations.

(c) Combat operations in Operation CORONADO XI terminated on 3 March 1968, at which time the MRF redeployed from CN THO to the vicinity of DONG T.N. The operation terminated on 4 March 1968 with the MRF assuming a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) mission while rotating two of the Brigade's maneuver battalions. The 3-47th Infantry debarked from the US Ship Collection and the 4-47th Infantry started embarkation aboard the same

(c) Operation TRUONG CONG DINH,

(1) Dates: 7 March 1968 thru Present.

(2) Mission: In coordination and cooperation with elements of the 9th Infantry Division (U.S.) and 7th ARVN Division conduct tactical operations in east, south central and central Dinh Tuong Province to locate, fix and destroy enemy elements in zone.

(3) Location: Dinh Tuong Province, Republic of Vietnam.

(4) Commander: Colonel Bert A. David.

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US:

1. 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.
3. Element of 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

(b) Other: 7th ARVN Division

(6) Concept and execution: CONFIDENTIAL
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(a) See Inclusion # 4 (Combat Operations After Action Report Tàu Chú (CONG DINH) (Phase 1)

(b) Operation TÀUONG CONG DINH, a combined RVN/US operation, comprised several tactical operations in Định TÀUONG Province, IV Corps Tactical Zone. The 7th RVN Division participated in offensive operations with elements of the 9th Infantry Division and the MRF to locate and destroy enemy elements within the Province. One of the 9th Infantry Division's missions was to protect the engineer effort and improve security along route 4 which is the economic life-line of the Delta's inhabitants and a prime interdiction target of the enemy.

(c) The MRF's participation in operation TÀUONG CONG DINH commenced on 7 March 1968, with the implementation of MRF OPORD 20-68. The maneuver battalions were deployed by riverine movement into CHI G.6 District, east DINH TÀUONG Province to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations and destroy enemy elements in zone. The Brigade's initial operation was amended when intelligence reports of concentrated enemy activity in an adjacent area caused redeployment/employment of the maneuver battalions. Subsequent operations were initiated as the Brigade's area of operation (AO) was extended west and into central DINH TÀUONG Province.

(d) During the first week of operation TÀUONG CONG DINH, the Brigade established contact with elements of the 261st and 263rd VC Battalions, and possibly the 314th VC Battalion as well. These "contacts" were never exploited to a profound result, due to the nonavailability of sufficient troop resources required to provide the commander with tactical flexibility. The enemy would frequently remain concealed until late in the afternoon, and then he would engage friendly forces with heavy volumes of fire. The enemy knows that he can establish contact quickly and then withdraw at his will under the cover of darkness.

(e) The remainder of the month of March saw little significant enemy contact. Engagements were frequent, but insubstantial. Intelligence reports continued to confirm the enemy's presence in areas accessible to the Mobile Riverine Force, but the
enemy was never entrapped in large units.

d. General. During the period 1 February 1968 to 31 March 1968, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery, utilizing A Battery in an airborne and land-mobile configuration and B and C Batteries in a waterborne configuration, participated in 17 different operations, responded to 2567 fire missions and fired 95,514 rounds.

(1) Viet Cong ambush. On the night of 31 January 1968 and early morning of 1 February 1968, B and C Batteries and Battalion Headquarters were ambushed on the RACH RUONG Canal after extracting from Fire Support Bases Florida (XS990551) and Alabama (XS944503). Friendly casualties were 1 WIA from the 1097th boat company, 1 WIA artillery, and 1 KIA from naval escort.

(2) Sustained operational movement. On 12 February 1968 the Mobile Riverine Force was engaged in operations in the Ap Bac area of DINH Tuong Province. The barge artillery, consisting of Battalion Headquarters and B and C Batteries, had established a fire support base at the LONG DINH Bridge vicinity (X381495). The order for extraction was issued and at approximately 1300 hours the battalion was ordered back to its base in DONG TAN. The extraction was initiated, however prior to closing into DONG TAN the unit was diverted and given the mission to deploy immediately to CAN THO vicinity (WR859135). Resupply boats were dispatched from the column into DONG TAN while the main body proceeded west on the MEKONG RIVER towards CAN THO. A 5000 gallon diesel refueling tanker was procured and loaded on a LCM-8 boat for boat refueling while in route. The naval escort joined the artillery convoy a short time after refueling in DONG TAN. The entire movement took approximately 30 hours and the LCM-8 boats did not experience any major maintenance problems. Water navigation especially during the night hours was no hindrance and all elements of the column remained in communications and arrived at their destination. The accomplishment of this long sustained movement without prior notice opens the possibility of supporting operations in the extreme southern areas of the MEKONG DELTA, where it would be difficult to employ regular land based artillery.

(3) Airmobility of the barge artillery. On the morning of 20 February 1968, C Battery was informed to prepare for an airborne operation from the fire support base near the CAN THO Airfield (WR853114) to PHONG DINH Province (WB947726). Airmobile
equipment to include a 1/4 ton truck and 3/4 ton trailer were flown in from DONG TAN on the evening of 20 February 1968. The battery prepared for the operation on 21 February 1968 and it was decided to lift all equipment, with the exception of the fire direction center vehicle, from the barges themselves. At 0100 hours 22 February 1968 the battalion along with both batteries (B & C) displaced from the CAN THO Airfield site and proceeded to a beaching site vicinity WR961997. This move was made for tactical reasons and to expedite the airlift by providing a shorter turn around time for the CH-47 helicopters. The battery reached in position at 0645 and was anchored by 0700. The first aircraft sortie arrived at 0710 for the battery commander and his party of 33 men. The remaining sorties arrived at 0800 hours. The battery closed into its airmobile site at 0930 hours and was completely laid and ready to fire at 1030 hours. Many problems were encountered on this first airlift such as early arrival of sorties and an occupation site which would not support the howitzer bases (a new one was selected upon arrival). The operation illustrated the versatility of barge artillery. The actual pickup of the guns and equipment was made directly from the barge decks, Initial Class V and resupply sorties were lifted off the decks of the MRB LST. The accomplishment of this airmobile mission demonstrated that deep penetrations into the MEKONG DELTA can be accomplished by airlifting artillery in the above manner.

(4) Land deployment of battalion operations center:
During the later part of March the 2nd Brigade conducted operations in DINH TUONG Province north of NHI THO. Since the maneuvering elements deployed a considerable distance inland, it was not feasible to employ the barge artillery batteries (B & C). As a result A Battery and the Battalion Headquarters and Operations Center deployed by road at dawn to the soccer field south of Tan Hiep on Route 4 (XS474551). The road march took approximately 1 1/2 hours and proceeded without incident. Duster elements (twin 40mm cannons on trucks) and quad 50 caliber machine gun vehicles were employed as FSB security along with two platoons of infantry. Command bunkers were built. During their construction the fires of artillery from fire support bases at CAN HIEP, T.N.N and BILN PHUOC were controlled by the use of radars mounted in three 1 ton trucks. Headquarters 2nd Brigade was co-located with the artillery battalion headquarters.

(5) Enemy mortar attack on Brigade FSB: In the early morning hours of 9 March 1968 the Brigade and Artillery Battalion
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and B Battery were mortared at Fire Support Base Halloran (XS576408). Two artillery breges were destroyed along with four M102 howitzers. Bravo Battery had 1 KIA and 6 WIA.

6. Tactics and Techniques. The missions assigned the Brigade during the reporting period were search and clear, search and destroy, and cordon and search missions against VC guerrilla and Main Force units within the Delta. The Mobile Riverine Force, of which the Brigade represents the Army complement, is ideally suited for its role in eliminating the enemy in the MEKONG Delta. To accomplish the Brigade's assigned missions and defeat the enemy in his environment, the Brigade made maximum use of the mobility provided by the ships and boats of Task Force 117 to insure that full support for Infantry Battalions was provided during operations. Within hours of receipt of movement orders, the ships and boats of TF 117 carried the Brigade's combat and combat support elements into AO's located virtually throughout the central Delta area. Upon employment of the Infantry elements within the AO, Naval boats of the task force provided direct and indirect fires to the maneuvering elements, in addition to establishing blocking positions on waterways adjacent to the AO.

1. Tactics. The tactics employed included reconnaissance-in-force operations (formerly titled, search and destroy), cordon and search and combat air assaults.

(a) Reconnaissance-in-force. Both battalions of the Brigade conducted extensive reconnaissance-in-force operations. When airmobile assets were available, the battalions air assaulted into multiple landing zones, and once on the ground, they began sweeping on two or more axes with a company size force on each axis. All companies were normally kept within supporting or reinforcing distance of each other. This technique of sweeping an area, provided the Battalion Commander the flexibility to reinforce, attack or encircle an enemy force once a company made contact.

(b) Cordon and search. The conduct of a joint Army and Navy cordon and search operation was one of the highlighting features of combat operations conducted during this reporting period. The characteristics of this type of operation have demonstrated a unique technique of the MRF. In addition to "sealing off" an area, the assault support patrol boats of the MRF are positioned to reinforce/support infantry elements during their search.
both indirect and direct fires.

(c) Combat air assaults. Operations during this period continued to illustrate that airmobile assets, when readily available, may influence the course of a tactical situation. Combat air assaults complemented riverine operations and made more effective the introduction of Rapid Reaction Forces into AO's to reinforce a unit in contact, exploit the enemy situation, and established blocking positions. The Brigade also expanded its employment range within AO's by employing its elements in combat air assaults. During several operations, battalions and companies conducted riverine movement to pick-up zones (PZ's) located near assailable waterways whenever they prepared for and executed airmobile assaults into the AO. The combination of riverine and airmobile deployment permitted the Brigade to introduce its fighting elements into areas where existing waterways were not navigable. Frequently, PZ's were co-located with fire support bases; from these PZ's one battalion conducted a rapid airlift into landing zones which tactically complemented beach locations for the other battalion.

(2) Techniques,

(a) "Eagle Float" - This technique involves employing infantry elements on Armored Troop Carriers (ATC's) in waterways adjacent to and within the AO. A series of multiple insertions are made at random, and not at preselected locations, to deceive the enemy as to the true area of intended beaching (assault landing). This technique also permits the commander to exploit targets of opportunity which develop during deployment to the objective area.

(b) Another new technique which enhances the Brigade's capabilities is one which Navy boats (monitors and/or ASP's) employ during movement of troops through waterways and canals. This technique is similar to the role armored cavalry plays in its conduct of route reconnaissance missions. It involves stationing a Riverine Assault Reconnaissance Element (BARE) in the van of convoys of troop-laden ATC's. The BARE directs reconnaissance fires into likely ambush positions and has frequently shown enemy fires from the banks of canals being transited. Its fire power is substantial and more than adequate to suppress fires from enemy positions when and if they are detected.
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(c) Employment of Fire Support Bases (FSB). The artillery FSB (floating barge-mounted artillery and Forward Brigade Command Post) is always moved into its support position at the latest possible time, and its movement is planned as much as possible along routes which lead into more than one possible area of operations. The artillery fire support bases are sited where their range will provide coverage to more than one area of concentration. It is not until the actual entrance of the riverine assault craft and their embarked infantry that the enemy can be sure where the force is going. The foregoing is a "technique" the refinement of which has materially helped the infantry to achieve surprise in an area of operations. When self-propelled artillery units are employed in support of the Brigade to reinforce its fires, Landing Craft Utility (LCM) are used to deploy the artillery units by riverine movement to either a FSB or to a beach site from whence the units conducts an overland movement to preselected FSB which affords coverage of the AO.

6. (c) Training:

a. During brief periods, when the Brigade rotated its maneuver battalions and/or prepared for future combat operations, training was conducted in areas demanding improvement noted during previous operations. Command emphasis was placed on small unit tactics and weaponry. All elements of the Brigade held training in care, cleaning, maintenance and inspection of the M16 Rifle. Weapons training included zeroing of individual weapons, and zeroing, bore-sighting and familiarization firing of other organic weapons.

b. The Brigade also conducted training in "Flame" and Riot Control Agent "CS" employment techniques. Flame training was conducted to familiarize personnel with the M7A2 Portable Flame Thrower, and methods of fixing and firing thickened fuels. Training conducted on Riot Control Agent - CS employment, during tactical operations, emphasized techniques for employing the E8 (16 tube) Tactical CS Launcher and the E158 Tactical CS Cannister Cluster.

(1) Navy elements of the MRF experimented in mounting E8 Launchers on turrets of their assault boats. This technique, though not yet employed in actual combat, would complement Naval fire employed against likely ambush positions established on or near waterways. This employment technique is also capable of routting enemy forces from fortified fighting positions on or in close proximity to beaching sites.
(2) Battalion commanders and their staffs were familiarized with techniques of employing the E158 Tactical CS Cannister Cluster to complement direct and indirect supporting fires. Instructions were also presented in delivery and arming procedures. As a result of the commanders' expressed interest in this munition, E158's are prepositioned aboard the logistical ship and at the Brigade's FSB for immediate pick-up and employment.

7. (C) Logistics:

a. General, Logistics support for the 2nd Brigade is characteristic of the force which it supports. Army logistics are inseparable from Navy logistics within the Mobile Riverine Force. Overall responsibility (per Army/Navy agreement) for logistical support of the Mobile Riverine Force is with the Navy. This concept/theory and practice have come closer together through the months. The theory of naval logistics support was prompted by a desire to provide the composite (Army/Navy) strike force with regular high volume flow regardless of the location of the operating base. This theory (of maintaining a water LOC) has proved to be both an asset and a liability to the MRF. The Navy is supported by the Army through the 34th Support Group and the 1st Logistical Command at VUNG TAU. Logistics support within the 2nd Brigade is provided by a forward detachment of 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion which is located aboard the support Landing Ship, Tank (LST) within the Mobile Riverine Base, and by a detachment of the 709th Maintenance Battalion which is located aboard the USS Askari. Supplies are sent by a resupply LST from VUNG TAU to the Mobile Riverine Base located at any suitable anchorage in the MEKONG DELTA; they are then off-loaded onto the MRF's organic support LST and placed under the control of 9th S & T Detachment (Forward). By exception, the 2nd Brigade also receives support from 9th S & T Battalion at CAMP MARTIN COX. TOE items and critical shortages are obtained through S & T, directly from CAMP MARTIN COX or after subsequent shipment to DONG TAN Base. During the reporting period, almost all classes of supply were delivered from VUNG TAU by resupply LST. Several exceptions occurred which required assistance from higher headquarters to eliminate specific critical shortages in II and IV Items. Fatigues and jungle boots were delivered from CAMP MARTIN COX, through DONG TAN, to the MRF to relieve critical shortages. Because of the tempo of operations during the reporting period, certain temporary shortages in Class I and Class V items occurred; these shortages were also dealt with on an exception basis.
b. During the reporting period tactical operations were intensified due to the enemy TET offensive; logistical activities increased concurrently. Greater volumes of supplies and maintenance were handled than in previous periods. Normally, approximately ten days of supplies are maintained aboard the support LST to meet requirements of the Army and Navy. These include a three-day safety level which allows for changes or delays in the resupply schedule from VUNG Tau. The stockage objective for Class V items maintained aboard the support LST was increased by approximately 25%, and 3,249 tons of all classes of supply were handled the S & T detachment aboard the LST. Of the 3,249 tons of supplies, 2,778 tons or 85% were Class V supplies and 391 tons or 12% of the tonnage were operational Class I supplies. The massive volume of Class V consisted of nearly 63% 105mm artillery requirements for the firing batteries of the 3-34th Artillery. The remaining small tonnage consisted of Class III, II and IV items; Class III products were handled directly by the Navy. Large volumes of Class III (AVGAS and MOGAS) arrive at the MRB for use by the Army elements, and are issued directly to using units from floating refuelers or tankers.

c. Internal Supply and Resupply.

(1) All classes of supply are stocked on board the support LST from which the two waterborne maneuver battalions requisition through the 9th S & T Detachment. The third maneuver battalion of the Brigade also has begun to channel supplies through the LST in anticipation of the Brigade's plans for employing all three maneuver battalions with the MEP. Although supplies (TOE and individual replacement items) for this battalion have already entered into the system, Class I, III, V, and expendable II and IV daily operational items are not included. These supplies are obtained through DONG Tam.

(2) Resupply within the Brigade varies according to the operational requirements and the transportation available. Two major means were used with many variations. Basically, combat units were either resupplied by boat or by helicopter. Depending on circumstances, units were sometimes resupplied directly from the support LST by helicopter, or the supplies were pre-staged at a designated location (either by boat or helicopter) and then flown to the combat units. A combination of direct airlift from the LST and staging sites was used with success. The staging site was generally within the area of a secured Fire Support Base or at some fixed install-
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RATION such as VINH 'ONG, CAN THO, or DONG T.JM. Resupply boat was often augmented by use of Boston Whalers to beach supplies for waiting units. In any event, resupply by boat can be effected only if the units are located close to a navigable waterway.

d. Material and Services.

(1) Supply.

(a) Class I: A total of 346,064 meals (combat individual) were issued, reflecting a peak operational period for both Army and Navy elements. On two occasions Class I stocks of "C" rations diminished to the extent that it was necessary to obtain a resupply from the 1st Logistical Command at CAN THO and the 9th S & T at DONG T.JM. Operational rations were supplemented by issue of 46,742 cans of chocolate milk and 178 "RA" sunny packs.

(b) Class II and IV: The MRF drew items of II and IV supplies from VUNG T.JU, CAMP MARTIN COX and DONG T.JM. The bulk of these items was obtained from VUNG T.JU. A number of critical shortages in individual clothing and equipment occurred during the early phase of the reported period. However, almost all shortages had been relieved by the end of the period. Some of the shortages resulted from a heavy influx of personnel replacements in December and January. These shortages had no severe impact until local sources were depleted. The only shortages which were not completely relieved were small regular trousers, and 108 jungle boots. It is anticipated that these items will arrive near the end of this reporting period.

(c) Class III: No significant problems were encountered, although a Navy AVGAS tanker was sunk by enemy fire on 15 April. The AVGAS tanker is used to refuel Army H-23 helicopters in the area of operations to minimize "down-time" for refueling.

(d) Class V: These supplies presented no problems during the reported period. From time to time brief shortages were experienced which required assistance from 1st Log Command or 9th Division Support Command Forward at DONG T.JM. Shortages were caused by higher expenditures during the VC TET offensive. Required loads were reconstituted in all cases and operations were not adversely affected.
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(c) Water: Fresh water is produced by
colorination and distillation processes on board each barracks ship;
it is then loaded on board each Amored Troop Carrier (ATC) as a
part of the basic load. Collapsible water plastic water jugs have
proved useful to provide water to the troops. Also supply of water
to troops using the five gallon collapsible jugs permits maximum
water to be carried with minimum weight. Unfortunately, the plastic
gugs often collapse under their own weight. A 2½ gallon collapsible
jug was more practical since the stress on the plastic material
would be greatly reduced. The additional weight incurred would be
negligible. Troops carry empty jugs which are then refilled.
Presently, five gallon water cans must be used to effect resupply,
due to the quantity of plastic jugs broken during the past month.
If fewer jugs were broken, the weight of essential water could be
greatly reduced.

(2) Services.

(a) Laundry, showers, and PX facilities are
provided by each ship.

(b) Graves registration services were provided
from aboard the support LST by Army personnel from the 9th S & T
Battalion. During the reporting period, a shortage of reefer space
developed when as many as 23 bodies were handled simultaneously.
Experience indicated that two reefer s were required, giving the MRF
a capacity of storing 10 bodies until transportation can be secured
(or 20 bodies if doubled up in each reefer box for short periods).
In addition to reefer space, some problems were apparent when the
MRF had no organic transportation to evacuate remains to the Saigon
mortuary. Headquarters IV Corps provided transportation assistance
when the 2nd Brigade was OPCON to IV Corps (particularly at Can Tho).
In other cases, only makeshift arrangements could be made despite
assistance requested from higher headquarters. Initially transporta-
tion was provided by the Brigade's utility helicopter, but the prac-
tice of providing the Brigade with a utility helicopter was dis-
continued early in the reporting period. Evacuation procedures
were modified during this period. Initially KHA's were evacuated
directly to the support LST with subsequent verification of death by
a physician. Coordination for obtaining a physician to verify
deach remained tenuous so that during the remainder of the period,
KHA's were evacuated with wounded through medical channels so that
death was verified by a physician. This has proved more satisfactory

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and will prevent death from being declared except by competent medical authorities.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) During the reporting period, Brigade maintenance was handled on a priority basis due to the lack of space aboard the ARL 30 (USS ASKARI). Maintenance was performed on board whenever possible but some maintenance items were evacuated to DONG. TAM or CAMF MARTIN COX when space or equipment on hand precluded on board maintenance. A special solution of on-site maintenance for deadline artillery howitzers proved useful in continuing availability of artillery despite intensified operations.

(b) Maintenance services during the reporting period were remarkably effective despite some basic problems. A limited size detachment with grossly inadequate space and certain repair parts shortages performed the herculean task of the Brigade's maintenance—including maintenance for the attached floating artillery units. The vigor of supporting elements of the 709th Maintenance Battalion characterized the maintenance effort. One notable and persistent shortage was that of repair parts for Boston Whalers. The transistorized ignition system has plagued all attempts to maintain an acceptable level of operational motors. Repair of boats and other equipment has been hampered by lack of space. Only one boat at a time can be handled because of space limitations. A floating maintenance barge was obtained, but because of its size (too large) it could not be towed alongside of the ARL 30 (USS ASKARI) consequently maintenance space remains a severe problem.

(4) Transportation:

(a) As a result of the Brigade's continuous operations and movement throughout the MEKONG DELTA, administrative transportation requirements presented a significant problem due to the absence of regular utility flights. Periodically, no or insufficient air assets were available for administrative flights. All available air assets, including command and control aircraft, utility aircraft and light helicopter companies in support of the Brigade, were used to transport personnel, equipment and mail items. All requirements were eventually fulfilled.

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8. (c) Civil Affairs:

a. CA OPERATIONS. Civil Affairs activities for the MRF were planned and developed to meet the requirements and limitations imposed by the force's unique organization and method of employment. The following major activities were conducted during the period covered by this report.

(1) Disaster Relief. The MOBILE MOBILIZED AREA (MRB) was positioned on the SONG TIEN GIANG DELTA near the City of VINH LONG on 6 February 1968, the first day that GVN officials and US advisory personnel were able to reconnoiter the city following the VC TET offensive. The MRF civil affairs officer contacted the Province and City GVN officials and the CORDS Province office to assist in planning for disaster relief and refugee control. It was determined the established CORDS agencies could meet all of the immediate needs of the city of relief with the following exceptions. An additional quantity of ten medium general purpose tents were required for refugee shelter and rations were required to feed 900 persons for a period of two weeks at the VINH LONG MILPHL. Hospital. These items were requested from 9th Division resources, and were received at VINH LONG within three days of the request. On 8 February 1968, one of the maneuver battalions assisted approximately 400 refugees who sought shelter on four ferryboats anchored at a safe location on the river. Medical treatment was provided for 90 patients and 850 pounds of food was distributed.

(2) MEDCAP's/DENTCAP's. The long range mobility of the MRF, coupled with the fact that it is the only US maneuver force operating in this portion of the Mekong Delta, enables the force to frequently conduct MEDCAP's and DENTCAP's in locales where the population has never received modern medical or dental treatment. No attempt can be made by the MRF to establish periodic medical support for the population of any given location. However, it is felt that the political benefits gained by these operations merit their continuation even if the definitive medical benefits do not. During this period, 29 MEDCAP's and DENTCAP's were conducted treating 1,885 patients.

(3) Commodity Distributions. Distributions of commodities were normally limited to foodstuffs, health items, and tools. Except in the case of minor health items distributed in conjunction with MEDCAP coordination is affected with local GVN
officials prior to making commodity distributions. Totals of 12,793 pounds of food, 471 individual health kits, and 500 farm tools were distributed during this period.

(4) Cordon and Search. On 24 February 1968 a cordon and search operation unique to the capabilities of the MRF was conducted on CU L:O NY ISLAND, VINH LONG Province. All civilians on the island (approximately 6000 persons) were directed to move to two collection points, after which a complete search of the island was conducted by the the maneuver battalions. Initial screening was conducted at these points which resulted in 433 detainees being transferred to the mainland for further interrogation. Those who remained at the collection points were provided with food and the opportunity to receive medical care, if they so desired. The MEDC.P's and DMC.P's were interesting in that the people living on this island probably had never seen a doctor or dentist before (according to the Senior Sub-Sector Advisor). While the medical value of this isolated visit might be questioned, it was well received and served as a valuable indication of the friendship of US personnel.

(5) Processing Innocent Civilians. The unusual terrain of the MEKONG Delta and the unique concept of employment of the MRF necessitates the use of a converted landing craft for the Combined Tactical Screening Center (Forward Collection Point). While the overall operation of this facility is essentially an S2 function, the S5 must maintain a considerable interest in the humanitarian aspects of the operation and also avail himself of the opportunities for psychological operations. Following initial screening of detainees, the S5 assumes control of those persons declared to be innocent civilians. The ultimate goal is to return these civilians safely to their homes. However, there is a variable period of time ranging upward to several hours during which these persons must be detained for their own safety or because of a temporary lack of transportation. During this period innocent civilians are assured of fair and humane treatment through the use of signs and leaflets as well as the use of an ARVN interpreter. The detainee is made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances by providing him with adequate food, medical treatment if required, washing facilities, and individual health kits containing a toothbrush, toothpaste, comb, and soap. A tape recorder is used to provide Vietnamese and American music, which is interrupted periodically for PSYOP messages. In addition, PSYOP movies provided by JUSPAO are shown during the detainee's stay at the center. When the detainee is released in
order to be transported to the area of his home, he is given a leaflet containing one hundred piasters and a letter explaining the reasons why he had to be detained. A total of 528 innocent civilians were processed during this period.

(6) TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP). Soldiers and sailors of the MRF contributed $44,044.74 for disaster relief for the people of Vietnam. This project specifically concerned relief from the destruction caused during the VC TET offensive. The MRF participated in the heaviest fighting in the city of MY THO during the TET offensive and it was decided to use this money for relief projects in the MY THO area. An orphanage/school complex received heavy damage during the battle for MY THO. Prior to the TET offensive there were 25 orphans and approximately 400 other children (mainly refugees) attending this school. Currently, there are 20 orphans and only 200 refugee children attending the school. All of the money collected, as well as additional food, clothing and school supplies have been turned over to the school's officials. All facets of this project have been coordinated with local US advisory elements as the transient status of the MRF precludes its providing the constant liaison required by a project of this nature. It is anticipated that this will be a continuing project until the Vietnamese school officials become self-sufficient once again.

(7) IMPACT Teams. Enemy activities during the TET offensive damaged or destroyed many of the RF/PF outposts along Highway 4 in DINH TUONG Province. Three Improvement Action Teams (IMPACT) were formed from 2nd Brigade resources to assist in the upgrading of these outposts. Each team consisted of an experienced Infantry Lieutenant and NCO. The teams deployed throughout the Province and conducted detailed surveys of each outpost. Requirements were submitted through US channels for required barrier materials including 144,500 sandbags, 867 rolls of concertina wire, 467 rolls of barbed wire, 12,850 pickets, 1100 sheets of steel roofing, 27,706 board feet of lumber, and various munitions. The teams are currently monitoring the receipt of these supplies and assisting the RF/PF troops in constructing 49 outposts.

b. LIMITATIONs. The following limiting factors affect civil affairs operations conducted by the MRF:

(1) Transportation. Although the MRF is 100% water mobile, space limitations on board the assault boats and restricted
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Airmobile assets reduce the effectiveness of the civil affairs effort. CA teams are normally transported throughout each operation on the medical support boat. This boat must be positioned to provide optimum support of the battalion troops in contact; this may not be the most advantageous location from a CA standpoint.

(2) Security. Most MRF operations are conducted in contested or VC controlled areas. CA teams must be provided with security forces in order to conduct their activities, which reduces the range of their operations from central locations in the battalion area of operation.

(3) Supply. CA teams are limited in the quantities of supplies which they may take into the AO. Space limitations on the medical support boats force the battalion to be exceedingly selective in supplies to accompany his team.

(4) Duration in the AO. Elements of the MRF normally remain in any given AO for one to three days. This time limitation restricts the nature of civic action projects which may be completed.

NEW OR IMPROVED PROCEDURES. As experience is gained in MRF operations and new tools become available, new and/or improved procedures are developed.

(1) Compilations of data from the Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) system are now provided on a monthly basis to the MRF by CORDS for all provinces in which the MRF operates. This data includes estimates of the status of pacification for each non-VC controlled hamlet within each district. This estimate is made by the individual best able to provide it, the District Senior Advisor. HES data is used to determine appropriate tasks to be assigned to each battalion prior to an operation. HES data gives the battalion CA officer and insight into the status of pacification within his AO prior to insertion.

(2) It is impractical for MRF CA officer to establish close liaison with GVN Province and District officials for each of the many areas in which the MRF operates. However, liaison is established shortly after insertion of MRF elements in a given Province/District. Valuable information may be exchanged in this manner without the risk of a security compromise for the operation.

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(3) A PSYOP/Civil Affairs Naval Officer was assigned to River Flotilla One in early April. Modifications to existing procedures are now being made to fully exploit the increased capabilities this organizational change has produced.

(4) During the period covered by this report an improved storage facility was made available in the MRB for CA activities. It is now possible to maintain an adequate basic load of CA supplies within the MRB thereby increasing the capabilities of the MRF to perform civic action projects.

(5) Increased command emphasis of civil affairs activities at all levels within the MRF has permitted quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of the overall MRF civil affairs program.

9. (C) Psychological Operations:

a. General: During the reporting period 7,432,083 leaflets were disseminated, 113 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made, 124 hours of VN radio time and 11 hours of movie time were logged in support of Brigade tactical operations. PSYOP support was directed toward Viet Cong units to decrease their effectiveness, increase their defections, and demoralize their units. PSYOP support was also directed toward civilians and detainees to explain the U.S. presence in the operational area, explain the role of the CVN, control the populace activities during operations, induce the people of Vietnam to become informers and gain support for the GVN.

b. Operations:

(1) General: The TET Offensive generally brought Brigade PSYOP activities to a halt. Six rapid reaction leaflets were immediately requested and five new tapes were developed utilizing themes suggested by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). However, there were no means available to employ the new tapes, and the requested leaflets were not available for two weeks. As a result of the TET Offensive, the Brigade's twice-weekly scheduled U-10 missions were also canceled during the first week of February. No organic aircraft were available to the Brigade for PSYOP. Navy Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB's) were used for loudspeaker missions, but the majority of combat operations were near cities, thereby reducing the effectiveness of waterborne broadcasts. It was not until 15 February, when the MRF moved...
in the vicinity of CAN THO that the Brigade PSYOP program was able to gain its momentum.

(2) Operation CONCAWD XI.

(e) General: PSYOP missions in support of the Brigade's operations during Operation CONCAWD XI consisted mainly of waterborne speaker broadcasts. This proved to be effective since a majority of the people live along the waterways, where most of the Brigade's operations occurred. Themes for the waterborne broadcasts were: "Explanation of U.S. Presence," "VC Desecration of TET," "NLF Suicide Missions," "Curfew Hours," "Clear the waterways," and "Search of Samvas," C-47, U-10, and UHIB aircraft were used for both leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts in the area of operation. Aerial leaflet and broadcast themes were: "VC Leaders Dupe Soldiers into Killing Innocent Civilians," "NLF Suicide Attacks During TET," "Return to Your People," and "Compatriots - Did You Ask the VC to Liberate You?" Artillery was also used to employ leaflets (twice) during combat operations.

(b) On 7 February 1968 a PSYOP program was presented to detainees apprehended during Operation CONCAWD XI. The Detainee Program has operated consistently since 7 February and has been integrated as a regular part of the Brigade's PSYOP program.

(c) On 21 February 1968, a rapid reaction tape was developed from interrogation of a POW captured during operation CONCAWD XI and a UHIB speaker mission was flown against the 303rd MF Battalion in PHONG DINH Province vicinity 'UR7997.'

(d) On 24 February 1968, the Brigade conducted a Cordon and Search operation on CU LAO NAY Island, located just southwest of CAN THO. PSYOP support was provided with aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, aerial leaflet drops, waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts, ground loudspeaker, radio broadcasts and hand distribution of leaflets and magazines. Loudspeaker broadcast themes provided for: an explanation of the Cordon and Search operation, Chieu Hai Appeals, and instructions to the inhabitants to evacuate the island using one of two established collection points. Leaflets were printed especially for the Cordon and Search operation and the themes were twofold: "Civilians go to Collection Points" and "VC Rally to Collection Points or Die."
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(3) Operation THUONG CONG DINH.

(a) General: During operation THUONG CONG DINH, PSYOP support consisted of Artillery leaflet drops, aerial C-47, U-10 and UHIB loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, waterborne and ground speaker missions, detainee program, and movie and radio missions. On 5 March 1968, posters were placed along Highway 25 between DO宁 and MY THO offering a reward for information leading to the capture of individuals responsible for the mining of a bus carrying Vietnamese orphans.

(b) On 7 March 1968, leaflets were distributed by ground troops in houses, bunkers, and along trails in CHO Gao District, DIN TUC Province.

(c) On 14 March 1968, PSYOP support was provided to Navy TF 117 elements during a Riverine Armed Reconnaissance Element (RARE) mission. The object of the PSYOP support was to make a loudspeaker broadcast to induce the Viet Cong to fight or join the legal government of Vietnam (Chieu Hoi). The lead assault support patrol boat (ASPB) was broadcasting the message, as the RARE proceeded west on the SaH KLANG RIVER. Approximately 1655 hours the RARE was taken under fire by the VC and one PSYOP team member was wounded in action.

(d) An Armed Propaganda Team (APT) was employed in support of the Brigade's operations in THUC GLANG District, KIEN HOA Province on 7 April. On two occasions the APT was able to obtain information which subsequently led to enemy contact with two companies of the 516 Battalion. During this operation, the APT distributed leaflets, in numerous villages. One of particular interest was PHUOC THAI Village which is a known VC Village. Posters were placed on trees and leaflets spread around the village. Themes were: "End of VC means Peace," "Freedom for the People," "Death of VC," "9th Division has Returned," and "9th Division will Return."

(e) Support: During the reporting period, the Brigade's psychological warfare program was conducted by an attached Field Team from the 10th PSYOP Battalion. Aircraft support (U-10 and C-47 aircraft) for aerial leaflet missions was provided by the 5th Air Commando Squadron.
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d. Equipment:

(1) The AN/UY15 speaker set was employed extensively in ground and waterborne speaker missions.

(2) The Mobile Audio/Visual Unit (MAVU) was used to present movies aboard the detention boat and on the ground; it was also used for radio broadcasts. On several occasions, the MAVU was employed on a limited basis for waterborne speaker broadcasts but its performance was inferior to the AN/UY15 speaker set.

e. Problem areas:

(1) Adequate resources (both organic and supporting) continue to pose difficulties in enhancing PSYOPS. Although the leaflets employed are of the highest quality, the reaction time to requests for new or other leaflets is two to three weeks from the date of requests. Several factors have definite influence on this problem; they are: frequent displacement of the MRF, telephone communications difficulties with the 10th PSYOP Battalion, and non-availability of transportation assets to effect personal liaison and direct coordination with same.

(2) Lack of PSYOP intelligence caused problems in that it was difficult to develop good themes without intelligence and an up to date area study. Much of the PSYOP intelligence received centers itself in that Northern Corps. Therefore it is completely invaluable and not suitable to Brigade's area of operation. The Brigade received very little PSYOP intelligence from Hoi Chanh or PW's. Limited resources made it impossible for Brigade PSYOP personnel to conduct their own interrogation.

10. (C) Chemical:

a. During the reporting period several chemical operations were initiated to complement tactical operations. All chemical operations and training were conducted under the staff supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

b. Operations conducted during the period were as follows:

(1) E158 bomblet employment: The E158 was employed against enemy fortified defensive positions to cause his abandonment.
of same and/or to suppress his fires while friendly elements advanced
to destroy him. The E158 was employed from UHID helicopters, with
a preset altitude initiator setting of 1,000 feet; excellent target
coverage was obtained.

(2) CS Persistent Bag drops: Two eight pound bags
of persistent CS-1 were wrapped together with detonation cord to
which a mechanical time fuse was attached. Several bags prepared
in this manner were dropped from an altitude of 1200 feet to deny
the enemy access to terrain; particularly in areas where they could
engage the boats and ships of the MRB.

(3) CS Grenade Dropfs: When employment of bulk CS was
not feasible and E158’s were not readily available, M7A3 CS grenades
were employed by air from their packing containers. Upon arrival
in the target area, the containers of grenades were dropped from
an altitude of 1000 to 1200 feet. The area of target coverage ob-
tained was equivalent to that of one E158 CS Cluster.

(4) DEFOLIATION: As a result of continuous enemy
threats to engage ships of the MRB, the decision was made to de-
foliate the vegetation along the south bank vicinity of DONG TAM.
The defoliation mission was performed by Air Force Ranch Hand Teams.

11. (C) Signal:

a. During this reporting period no major communications
problems occurred. Single-Side-Band and airborne relay systems
were extensively employed during the Mobile Riverine Force’s transit
from DONG TAM to CAN THO. The Single-Side-Band net provided the
Brigade communications with ships of the NRF and the 4th Corps
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at CAN THO. Also, during the
period of transit, the Brigade utilized the Radio Wire Integration
facilities at DONG TAM to communicate with the Division Forward
Command Post located at DONG TAM. No significant communication
problems were experienced during the conduct of all operations
in the VINH LONG, MY THO and CAN THO areas. The primary means of
communication was FM voice, utilizing the AN/VRC 46 radio. The
Brigade and battalion’s Command and Control Boats (CCB) were also
employed to provide manual relay and automatic retransmission when
required, but this type of capability was a minimum requirement.

b. While in the CAN THO area the Brigade’s multichannel
voice communications system, AN/TRC-24 was centered in a communications terminal located at CAN TH0. This terminal was provided and operated by the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division. Using this system the Brigade provided telephone service to CAN TH0, DONG TAH, and CAMP MARTIN COX. Teletype service to SAIGON, CAN TH0, and CAMP MARTIN COX and DONG TAM was also provided by this system. During the period when the Brigade conducted tactical operations in the DONG TAH/CAN TH0 area the AN/TRC-24 system was centered in a 9th Signal Battalion-DONG TAM terminal which provided the same service as outlined above with telephone service into 7th ARVN Division TOC at MY TH0.

One innovation during the period of this report was the installation of an AB-577/G mast on the stern of the USS Benowah. A cross frame was installed on this mast to mount four RC-292 antennae, two of which are used for the 2nd Brigade's Command Operation and Intelligence nets. The other two antennae are used by the Navy. This system is approximately 90 feet from the waterline and it increased the Brigade's voice communications range by at least 5 kilometers.

d. Secure FM voice was provided on the 2nd Brigade's Operation and Intelligence net from the 2nd Brigade TOC on the USS Benowah to all Battalion TOC's, located on the APL-26 and the USS Colleton, and to the Brigade's and Battalions' Command and Control Boats. The Battalions' Command and Control Boats were utilized as forward Battalions Command Posts. The Brigade's CCB was used mainly as a manual relay and/or automatic retransmission station. The 2nd Brigade's Forward Command Post was located on a 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery CP Boat which housed FM voice radios, AN/VRC-46 radios, and Single-Side-Band equipment, AN/GRC-106. A KY-8 was also installed on this boat to secure voice service on the Brigade Operations and Intelligence Net.
SECTION II

Lessons Learned:

Commanders' Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. PERSONNEL: None.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

   a. (C) Use of "CS" against bunkers.

      Observation. Employment of "CS" against fortified fighting positions caused the enemy to abandon the position and expose himself to friendly fires.

      Evaluation. During several offensive operations against well constructed/fortified fighting positions, the employment of "CS" 40mm grenades has dislodged enemy personnel from the positions when artillery and other indirect fires couldn't. This does not imply that artillery or airstrikes are not effective against well constructed fortified positions. Neither does it imply that "CS" employment is the most effective means of driving enemy forces from bunkers. The employment of 40mm "CS" grenades complemented all fires directed against the positions and caused the enemy to become confused and desperate, not only to evade the friendly forces, but also the irritant agent. The "CS" grenade employed by the 40mm grenade launcher affords commander the capability of employing "CS" at a long (300 meters) and close range. Presently the 40mm "CS" grenade is an "Insure" item.

      Recommendations.

      (1) That the 40mm "CS" grenade be classified as a "Standard" item, and a basic load be determined and issued.

      (2) Further, that during the interim period (Pending Standardization) more 40mm "CS" grenades be issued to afford maximum use.

   b. (C) Close air support observation.

      Observation. Light helicopter fire teams supporting
friendly forces in contact during hours of darkness often have difficulty in identifying friendly positions.

**Evaluation.** Units in contact during hours of darkness often fail to properly mark their position and establish communications with the light fire team providing close air support. Prior to employing light fire teams the ground force commander must mark the limits of his positions, and verify the enemy force location. In addition the light fire team should establish communications with the ground commander. All friendly units in the immediate area of contact must monitor the radio net controlling employing close air support.

**Recommendations:** Commanders and small unit leaders should be thoroughly familiar with the ordnance capabilities of light fire teams and proper marking techniques, and if possible, that aviators be briefed on the overall tactical situation prior to establishing communications with the ground force commander. Adjustments of close air supporting fires must be made by the ground force commander.

c. (C) Employment of armed propaganda teams.

**Observation:** Armed propaganda teams enhance both psychological operations and intelligence collection efforts.

**Evaluation.** An armed propaganda team was employed in support of the Brigade during combat operations conducted in Kien Hoa Province. The team made valuable contributions not only in the PSYOP area, but also in the intelligence collection effort. On several occasions timely and accurate intelligence was provided by the team after their interrogation of local civilians. The intelligence collected resulted in the Brigade establishing contact with the enemy.

**Recommendations:** That an armed propaganda team be attached to the Brigade.

3. **TRAINING:** None.

4. (C) **INTELLIGENCE:**

a. (C) Possible Compromise of Projected Combat Operations.
Observation. Early coordination and dissemination of operation plans and orders may tend to provide the enemy with advance/adequate warning of the intended AO or target.

Evaluation. The Mobile Riverine Force operates throughout the central MEKONG DELTA as a Mobile Striking Force seeking targets developed by timely and effective intelligence. As such, the Brigade does not have a specific tactical area of operation and is therefore required to effect coordination for AOs and specified strike zones. Early coordination and dissemination of this information, prior to the commitment of friendly forces is a particular disadvantage because it allows adequate time for enemy forces to exit the area or prepare to defend against the introduction of friendly forces into the AO. In addition the desired flexibility for committing forces in any area of operation selected/designated, as a result of immediate and concrete intelligence, is unobtainable due to the coordination required.

Recommendation: None.

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. (U) Use of Bandoleers for ammunition magazines.

Observation. Inadequate protection of magazines caused malfunction of M16 rifles.

Evaluation. Dirt, mud, and other inert matter accumulate in ammunition (magazine) pouches during normal field operations causing a high malfunction rate of the M16 rifle. Troops presently try to carry magazines in cotton bandoleers in order to alleviate the situation, but bandoleers are difficult to obtain and are used beyond the point of serviceability.

Recommendation. That a lightweight nylon bandoleer be issued in sufficient quantities to allow each man to carry 5.56mm magazine high on his body and completely covered. The nylon bandoleer would afford good protection from mud and dirt and would dry and drain quickly if immersed in water.

b. (U) Collapsible water jugs.

Observation. Five gallon water jugs often
collapse when filled to their capacity, by the stress endured.

**Evaluation.** The plastic collapsible water jug permits maximum quantities of fluids to be transported in a container of minimum weight. However, the weight of the water causes considerable stress on the plastic material when the jugs are filled, which in turn subsequently causes the jugs to collapse and break after frequent use. A two and one-half (2½) gallon capacity collapsible jug, made of the same composition would be more practical in terms of reducing the stress on the plastic material.

**Recommendation.** That a two and one-half (2½) gallon capacity plastic water jug be procured for field use.

c. (U) Protective cover for LAW.

**Observation.** The absence of an outer protective cover induces possible damage to, and increases the chances of malfunction of the light anti-tank weapon (LAW).

**Evaluation.** Dirt, brush and constant handling of 66mm rockets M72 (LAW) bend; breaks and fouls many of the exposed small parts of the weapon. Extension of the firing tube and actual firing become difficult and unnecessarily hazardous. Unserviceable LAW's must be destroyed thus creating great expense and loss of time.

**Recommendation.** That a high impact waterproof cover be procured to protect M72 rocket launchers.

6. **ORGANIZATION:** None.

7. **OTHERS:** None.

SECTION III WITHDRAWN, HQ, DA; CONTAINED IN DIVISION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

Inclosure 6 to Section I: Improved Usage of AN-BS-4 Aerial Loudspeaker System

The AN-BS-4 1000-watt loudspeaker system, a standard item of issue, was modified somewhat to enable its use in different configurations. Two sets of one each amplifier and remote were mounted on plywood bases and attached to two frames, each holding one bank of speakers, which enable the use of a single bank of 250-watt speakers in a vehicular mode on two vehicles. This modification allows greater flexibility in the use of speaker systems to support ground tactical and psychological operations and medcaps. A diagram of the system is attached as Tab 1.

The remaining 500-watt portion of the system was made into a double bank of speakers to fit on the H-23 helicopter, utilizing a U-frame and brace to fit the landing skids. The two amplifiers and remotes were originally placed in a four-sided box-like configuration which fits easily into the cockpit of the helicopter between the operator's legs, and produces excellent results. An improved version of this is being constructed at this time, consisting of two plywood bases each mounting a single remote and amplifier identical to the 250-watt configuration, mounted back to back on a wooden frame, and paralleled. A diagram of the system is attached as Tab 2.

The systems are designed so that they are, with a 15-minute preparation time, easily converted again into the original 1000-watt configuration, and ready to fit in UHID aircraft.

The 500-watt system, vehicular mounted, has been field tested and found extremely effective at distances of 1500 meters.

The 500-watt system, mounted on the skid of an H-23 helicopter, was tested and found to be extremely satisfactory from an altitude of 2000 feet, airing a broadcast at an angle of 45° to the ground. As time and aircraft availability permit, the system will be further tested to determine its limits and performance characteristics.
The speaker bank may be easily turned to face any direction and may be angled up or down.

---

hook to allow rapid connection to 1000 watt frame or 500 watt frame

---
The amplifier unit is hooked on one or each side then paralleled by the remotes.

The carrying handle has 1/4" x 2" x 3" aluminum bars on both sides.

The side view shows an aluminum frame and 1/4" x 2" aluminum clamps under the unit.

Wires are connected to the inside of the helicopter.

1" angle iron x 3' 8" crosses under the unit.

The frame and clamps are made of 1/4" x 2" aluminum.

Bolts secure the unit to the helicopter skids.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 9th Infantry Division (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CG, 9th Infantry Division

REPORT DATE 12 May 1968

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