


1.6 kilometer = 1 mile

Situation from 1100 – 1500 – the Battle of AP Bac II begins.



Note the number of large and small streams on the map – each required a crossing, often using ropes and air mattresses

C/4-47 embarked on ATCs at approx 1015 – they move south along the yellow route and landed south of Objective 20 at approx. 1135


A/4-47 continues moving south thru Objectives 16 and 18 – the rice paddy mud make movement difficult

C/4-47 moves to the north to establish a blocking position

After searching Objective 19, C/3/47 is order to establish a blocking position northwest of Objective 21


C/4/47 passed close by the VC 5th Nhe Bn when moving south by ATC – and C/3-47 were twice only a stream crossing away from VC fortifications. The battalion was incredibly disciplined.

Situation at Approximately 1150




- At 1150 “all hell broke loose. C/4-47 and A/4-47 almost simultaneously start receiving very heavy fire from a well executed L-shape ambush.
- The VC companies reported earlier in the day were there, but over 1.5 kilometers east of their earlier reported location.
- A/4-47 was in a precarious position as the company was readjusting their movement and had closed very close to VC bunkers – the company took devastating hits in the first few minutes including losing command and control – there was virtually no cover between the company and the VC bunker lines
- C/4-47 was hit at the same time, but had a 30 foot wide stream and small dike for some protection
- 8 C Co Weapons platoon in Soldiers in 2 PABs (Boston Whalers) died very early as they were engaged at point blank range

Situation 1150 – 1600




- The initial A/4-47 casualties included all 3 platoon leaders and their RTOs – this created problems in providing indirect fires to the company as friendly locations were vague
- As the friendly locations became known, including direct observation by airborne observers, significant firepower was applied to the area
- C/4-47 was in a little better situation, but early on indirect fires were delayed because of the proximity on the north side of the VC positions – our units were about 800 meters apart
- Great credit must be given to the Navy monitors and ATCs – their crews moved within meters of enemy bunkers and engaged them at close range. During the battle 15 sailors were WIA.

Situation 1150 – 1600



- Col Fulton and LTC Tutwiler rapidly assessed the situation and ordered unit moves to assault the VC position
- C/3-47 was returned to 3-47 control and ordered to move north toward Obj 17, then east across 2 streams to attack the bunker line between A/4-47 and C/4-47
- B/4-47 was ordered to move east to Obj 16 and then south to Obj 18 to assist and relieve A/4-47
- A/3-47 and B/3-47 were ordered to move east to seal off the northwest side of the battle
- The Navy's TF 117 ordered total support with River Squadron 9 in sealing off the area on the Rach Nur stream
- 2nd Bde releases Recon/3-47 and Recon/4-47 to 4-47 control – both platoons are moved from the MRB by ATC to the 4-47 command post collocated on the Group 11 Command and Control Boat

Situation 1600 – morning of 20 June



We must remember that on 19 June the sunset was at 6:28 pm – Vietnam is close to the equator – IT GETS DARK EARLY – AND VERY QUICKLY


Major events occurred during the night, but I refer to “Boys of 67” for further details

EXCEPT, the moves of C/4-47 were incredible. CPT Lind left one platoon on the south of the stream and attacked the VC fortification with his 1st and 2nd platoons – they attacked until they ran out of ammunition and the decision was made to assume a defensive position during the night

As written in “Boys of 67” and Army documents incredible acts of heroism occurred during the night in retrieving dead and wounded soldiers – we all owe an incredible debt to our partner sailors who saved numerous lives and replenished companies with ammunition, WATER, and food along the streams

Major efforts were made during the night to assist A/4-47 – most were successful, but there was a game between providing illumination to search the battlefield – illumination drew fire that a subsequent captured document (my memory while at division headquarters) that said the VC liked illumination in battle because they could easily shut off the illum with a few shots and then use the cover of dark to evade the area.

Night of 19 June to – morning of 22 June



Night of 19-20 June –

- Advantage is taken of darkness to assist A/4-47, C/4-47 and C/3-47 in evaluating casualties.
- At times an Air Force “Puff the Magic Dragon” dropped flares to illuminate the battlefield. The light helped recovery, but also allowed VC snipers to locate targets.
- Once again the Navy units were instrumental in recovery of casualties, resupplying units with ammo, water, and rations; and providing screens on the waterways.

20 – 21 June –

- Battlefield recovery continued during the day – A/4-47 is transported to the USS Colleton via ATCs
- Extensive effort was made to locate VC units that escaped during the night – C/4-47 moved south in pursuit via foot and ATC and in conjunction with a 3-60 company encircled and destroyed a VC platoon
- 4-47 established a defensive position late in the afternoon
- The 4-47 command post was established on the Rach Xom collocated with the River Squadron 9 CCB